



Women's Foreign Policy Group
The Faces of Contemporary Islam: Practice, Theory, and Foreign Policy
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Panel 2: European Policies and Attitudes on Islam

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Shireen Hunter: We're going to talk about Islam in Europe. I think we have heard so much about Islam and the West as if they were totally separate. But of course now we have bits of the Muslim world in the West, in the form of Muslim communities. I personally became very much interested in this during my years of living both in England and in Brussels, and of course in France. But this has been – as far as the US interest in this issue is concerned – a fairly recent phenomenon, and before there wasn't really much interest. Like all the other panels, we have excellent presentations. Unfortunately, one of our speakers, because of the Air France strike, couldn't be here. But this gives us an opportunity to hear more comments from our other speakers, John Bowen and Susan Moeller.

Obviously the question of Muslims in Europe is an important one, and it is facing European societies with a variety of challenges, including the whole issue of identity and the question of the limits of European tolerance. It's very easy to be tolerant when you're all alike and you don't have anything to be tolerant of, but when you have to, there's a question of the meaning of integration: is integration the same as assimilation? But also, I attended a conference in Salzburg, and one of the participants was a Muslim activist from the UK, definitely very integrated, but he said – he had fairly dark skin – if you only look at my appearance, there's nothing I can do about my appearance. These are some of the really major issues that are going on.

The other is also that because we are going to talk about specifics, it's really not good to talk about Islam in Europe or Muslims in Europe. The title of a book that the University of Leuven published in the late 1980s, because in Europe this was a focus of interest early on, is *Les Islams d'Europe*, the "Islams of Europe." And that is true, because the Muslim community in Europe is diverse. Moreover, each of the three main concentrations of Muslims has a different ethnic profile, and so on. So this is something that's going to be with us, and again, Carnegie, like in

many other things, has taken the lead in this area, and we have excellent scholars. And so I would like to give the floor to Professor Bowen and we're looking forward to it.

John Bowen: Thank you very much. I'm honored to be the one male Carnegie Scholar asked to speak today – and my name doesn't even have any gender ambiguities – but it's also half true, because I'm also channeling Jytte Klausen, who can't be here, and so I'm adding a bit of the Eastern and Northern perspective on what I have to say.

Europe is important because we don't really know what Europe is. And you say, come on, of course we do, but is Turkey in Europe? Anybody? No? Well, it's in the Council of Europe. And the Council of Europe is countries that are subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court on human rights, and a number of major European decisions, including about headscarves, have come out of Turkey. There are a number of different Europes, but Europe itself is so variegated in terms of its historical experience with Islam. We've got the southeastern portion, where you've got Muslims who have been Muslims for generations. You have Turkey itself. You've got parts of Russia. You've got Andalusia, with its memories of being part of the Islamic world. And then you have places such as Britain and France with long colonial experiences in parts of the Muslim world, and then you have places like the Scandinavian countries with very recent, very shallow relationships to kind of a scattering of Muslim immigrants, so it's very difficult to generalize.

Now, there are some things that we can say help us understand Europe in general – Western Europe, which is what I'll be speaking about – that there were these colonial ventures, especially involving France and Britain, but also involving Italy and Germany to a lesser extent, followed by labor migration from some majority Muslim countries. France was earliest, starting in the late 19th century, but especially after the end of World War I, for rebuilding Europe, across many of these countries. Then there was a period during the '60s and early '70s where you had more and more families settling, rather than simply patterns of circular migration.

The recession in the mid-1970s curtailed the labor migration, but led to family reincorporation; new patterns of migration. And then of course in the 1980s, a rise in a sense of being Muslims rather than being North Africans or West Africans or South Asians, having to do both with generational effects – more young Muslim men and women growing up and asking who they were – but also events taking place in the world.

And then in the 1990s and 2000s, I think what we see is a divergence. We see a very small number of people becoming radicalized; you know all about – too much about – them. And a much broader number of Muslims working with people in various European countries, creating new institutions, seeking ways to have adaptation in both directions; between Western European legal systems and Islam, leading to periods of experimentation and creativity with respect to schools, new ways of building mosques, new ways of thinking about even such important but often overlooked practices as sacrificial slaughters, sacrificial killing of animals.

But through all this, one has to come back to the very different pathways that Muslims are following in each of several European countries. Talk about Euro-Islam or Muslims in Europe, in general, misses these deep-seated pathways, and I tend to analyze them in terms of two kinds of

processes: one is called transnational pathways. Where did Muslims come from, in this particular case? Where did they settle? What sorts of continuing relations, through marriage or communication, do they have with their countries of origin? That's one kind of frame of analysis. The second is the kinds of structures of opportunity in each country, which basically means, how do we get things done here? Muslims, like all other immigrants, figure out pretty quickly how you get things done, and they adapt. So that's led to very different ways of building institutions and thinking about Islam in each of the European countries.

I'm going to give you four snapshots, and as I do I'll bring in also – although not as much as I'd like – some of the important differences in the Muslim populations themselves that Shireen Hunter also underscored. I want to mention the UK, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, probably in descending order of time. If I had to sum up what we see in the UK, it really is a combination of distinct communities with strong transnational ties back to countries of origin. Why is this? Well, I'm bound to look at these transnational pathways and these structures of opportunity.

The Muslims who came to Britain, to England in particular, were overwhelmingly from South Asia: Pakistan and Bangladesh and India. But even more interestingly was the very sort of narrow targeting that took people from a district called Mirpur and a district called Sylhet in Bangladesh and transplanted often sub-caste groupings and villages over into particular neighborhoods in cities in Britain. So you have parts of Bradford or Birmingham which were really organized around these sub-caste or village patterns of authority, which also means that there's a preference to seeking spouses for children back to your own village or your own sub-caste, often with a close kin. There was a tremendously high rate of close cousin marriages from these populations and similarly from Sylhet into East London.

So very distinct local communities, which just happened to coincide with a structure of opportunity in Britain, which in the '60s and '70s was aiding local ethnic associations so that they could get things done locally. That's how you do it in Britain: you want Halal food in the school, there's a local council; you want Islamic religious materials, there's a local group you work with. As in the 1980s, government aid pulled back. Mosques filled some of the gap; this pattern of doing things locally was already there, plus you had this localism of residence exacerbated by the fact that Muslims from the northern part of South Asia, which is probably the most divided part of the world in terms of theological schools.

So you had where people came from; you had their particular allegiances, Sufis, or Deobandis, or Tablighi Jama'ah people, reproduced in Britain. So there is a high degree of differentiation with a high degree of transnational ties. My project I'm involved with now, for example, is working with these sharia councils or sharia tribunals – mediation bodies is really what they are, they're not courts – which take on demands from women to seek Islamic divorces, because there's no Islamic court that can give them a divorce. These are incredibly transnational. I was at a session in May, for example, where there were seven cases. There was a woman from Somalia, there were several women from Pakistan, there was a woman from Mauritius, and the men were living currently in Italy, Pakistan, and Mauritius, and in two cases, places unknown.

Women came to seek Islamic divorces at these councils. The councils have a certain degree of legitimacy because of these pathways that have been laid down, with local control, reference to the transnational world from which people have come. So this is a particular kind of set of transnational pathways and structures of opportunity which have produced very specific ways which Muslims have built institutions and thought about things. What they're doing at these sharia tribunals is saying, how do we do it? What's the Hanafi way of doing things in, say, Pakistan? Can we do that here? If we can, let's do that. And a woman may be from Pakistan, she may have been married in Yemen, she may end up remarrying back in Pakistan and settling in Dubai. So there's a great deal of attention to the international legitimacy of what these sharia councils do.

Let me turn to France. This is going to be brief. In France, I would characterize the overall pattern as being an emphasis on broad national organizations and playing down community differences. This has, again, to do with the transnational pathways. France, even earlier than England, was bringing people to work in French factories, replacing the men who fought in World War I for example, or to fight in World War I and World War II. And this created a pattern of circular migration, largely from Algeria, which was part of France. It was not a colony, they were citizens. There are people from Algeria in France today whose great-great-grandparents were citizens of France. They were second-class citizens, but nonetheless they were citizens.

But it created a very strong sense of Algerians angry about inequality, angry about lack of opportunity, but being part of France nonetheless. It also strongly affected the character of public discourse about Islam, because the largest group of Muslims in France – and by the way, France has the largest percentage of Muslims, around 5%; they don't keep statistics but that's what people guess – come from North Africa, where there are not the sorts of strong theological differences that characterize northern parts of South Asia.

This is a historical accident, but it means that it's been relatively easy in France to build national organizations, for federations of Islamic groups to have a voice in national politics. Mosques tend to be multiethnic, though there are arguments often about who gets to be the imam, but they do tend to be multiethnic, whereas in Britain they're much more likely to be ethnically specific. This has also given rise to various forms of reasoning. France doesn't have a high level of toleration for public representations of ethnic or religious identity, outside of a very narrow sense of what religion is, meaning churches, mosques, things like this. But a sharia tribunal is just not thinkable. Even people leafleting in the streets; it can be forbidden. It's a very narrow sense of what's legally possible, so Muslims as a result have taken on very restricted kinds of institutional experiments, with respect to mosques and to a very small degree with respect to Islamic private schools.

And it means that Islamic thinking and institution-building in France has been very different from England. There is a much stronger attempt to think about ways in which Islamic practices and French legal practices can find equivalences; through contracts, for example. Can we think about a marriage in city hall as being already an Islamic marriage? There's no attempt to give women Islamic divorces with a council. What imams tend to say is, if you've got a civil divorce,

you're already divorced, as long as you aren't at fault. Just don't worry about it; God is all-knowing and God will forgive.

I'm going to turn to two other cases more briefly. First of all, the Netherlands, where I would characterize – and again, this is very rough and very broad-brush – the main tendency has been to create ethnic divisions, which is partly a result again of transnational pathways. Unlike Britain and France, who had strong colonial ties to the majority of populations, who came to those countries – the Turks and the Moroccans who make up most of the Muslims in the Netherlands – had no prior relationship to the Netherlands. Indonesia, of course, was a colony of the Netherlands, but the Indonesians in the Netherlands are majority non-Muslim, though there are some Muslims there.

They came into a structure of opportunity which was sort of on the last legs of a policy of pillarization where the Catholics, Protestants, and even the socialists in their own fashion had their own schools, their own religious organizations, their own political parties, even their own shops, very often. So you could grow up only knowing people of your own religion. And Muslims saw this and said, hey, give us a pillar. We have the right to one too. We need our own schools with teachers teaching in Moroccan or teaching in Turkish, and of course we need mosques, etc., etc.

At the moment there was no strong argument against this, except that this pillarization policy was already starting to crumble a little bit in the Netherlands. But what it did do is trigger some Dutch policies for providing teachers in the native languages of immigrants, for aiding people in terms of where they came from, etc. What's been produced, however, now, is a policy where first there was an allowing the Turks and Moroccans to occupy their own pillar, to call it that, and then when the Dutch became aware of problems, very recently, the assassination of [Theo] van Gogh and others, there was a radical turn against this in the sense that these people are not fitting into our society at all, of great separation.

Even Dutch policy today, however, identifies people by ethnic group, sorted into indigenous peoples, the *autochtoon*, that's the Dutch, and the *allochtoon*, the others, the non-indigenous. In fact, aid to schools is based on where people come from. So that's more or less where we are today. A turn against this; in fact, the Dutch citizenship test, if anyone's ever had a chance to read those, asks questions about values. Okay, what do you do if someone has a birthday party? Do you send a card, or send flowers, or show up? Well, Dutch people don't know, but if you're Moroccan and you don't know, you're not going to get in.

Finally, Germany: Germany – again, very broad-brush – I would focus on the tendency towards public sponsorship of religious groups as public corporations. Some of you may know, if you pay taxes in Germany, a little bit of your taxes go to a church, and it also goes to your burial plot. That's a problem if you don't want to decide what religion you are and you want to be buried as opposed to cremated. And there has been an attempt to find the Muslim equivalent to these other religious corporations that already exist, so they can have their bit of the tax, so they can provide educational materials for schools.

The problem is that Muslims coming in from Turkey aren't really organized that way. And I need to say something at this point about the Turkish specificity. I've mentioned South Asians, I've mentioned North Africans; I haven't talked about West African Sufi groups, but I could in discussion. But the nature of the Turkish immigration has been very different. Again, there is no prior colonial relationship, no great familiarity with German language or customs, although a long history of labor migration; labor recruitment. But the nature of the Turkish implantation in Germany was that there were strong ties either back to the state, the Bureau of Religious Affairs in the Turkish government, or to the Milli Görüş, a large organization that has been important throughout Europe in starting mosques. So two competing networks of people, both with strong ties back to Turkey. Indeed, Turkish language television programs in Germany are as much aimed at Turkey as they are at Turks in Germany. There's a very strong sense of reference back to Turkey.

Things are changing radically in Germany, as they are in many of these countries, from a situation where the Turks were considered to be never eligible for citizenship because of this ethnic notion of German citizenship, just to be guest workers. There has been a fairly rapid incorporation of some Turks into German political structures. Indeed, yesterday or the day before, the new leader of the Green party is a Turkish politician who I had the opportunity to meet this past summer. So these things do change, and can change often quite rapidly.

I haven't talked about Scandinavia, where one of the problems has been, as you know, it's been the epicenter of controversy about toleration. One of the problems in Scandinavia is the very recent character of labor migration from a whole range of countries, followed very quickly by refugees and seekers of asylum. The welcoming nature of many of the Scandinavian countries – I'm thinking of Sweden in particular – has meant that there's a multitude of people from many, many backgrounds. All of them happen to be Muslims living in these countries, very often with the desire to go home at some point, which has meant that the incentive for Scandinavians to learn the languages of all these people or vice versa, the incentive for these people to learn Swedish or Danish or whichever language it is, has been much, much lower than is the case with the other countries I've been mentioning. This has created a kind of a brittleness; a lack of bridge institutions as compared to Britain or Germany or France or the Netherlands, and has resulted in some of the inabilities to work things out with intervening institutions that we saw, for example, in the Danish cartoon case.

I hope I've made the case that there are these deeply ingrained pathways in each of these countries which have shaped the direction Muslims are going. Muslims in Britain are going, with the new generation, towards a different kind of sharia council. The new scholars, as they call them, not judges, are going to be people born in Britain, with a very different idea of how to fit in, but they'll have their own institutions. They won't be courts, they'll be tribunals. In France, if anything, we're moving away from that model entirely, where it's much closer integration of civil law and Muslims. I don't see any Islamic institutions coming up in the near future that would have any legal impact.

The Netherlands is between policies, but it has this emphasis on ethnic identity rather than religious identity, which has had very specific effects on policy. That said, there are some currents and developments that I think you can see in the future across Europe, and I'll close

with this. I'll just mention one, which sounds trivial but I think is very helpful, which is the importance of contracts. As many of you know, contracts are extremely important in Islamic law. Marriage is a contract, it's not a sacrament. Many of the particular prescriptions and proscriptions one finds in Scripture have to do with contracts.

Creative jurists, both from Islamic backgrounds and from civil law backgrounds in Europe, have started to work towards new ways of finding contract as a bridge between the Islamic normative tradition and the various legal traditions of Europe. So I think one of the things we have to look at closely in the future, and I myself do this along with many others, are the ways in which legal innovation and legal creativity can provide new institutions that will bridge these particular divides. Thank you.

Shireen Hunter: Thank you very much for an excellent overview of that. Obviously this is a very complex issue and there are many things to cover. And now I have the pleasure to introduce Susan Moeller, who's going to talk to us about the media coverage of Muslims in Europe by the United States.

Susan Moeller: Thank you very much, Shireen, and thank you to Patricia and the Women's Foreign Policy Group and to Ambika and Hillary and Patricia from Carnegie for having me. I should say, for those of you who don't know or haven't looked at the bio, that I'm a 2008 Carnegie Scholar, so I'm at the beginning of my research rather than at the end, but I am picking up projects that I've long worked on, so you'll forgive me for some lack of detail.

Today I want to talk about how US and UK media cover Islam, primarily for audiences who do not have a personal connection to it. Media, across the board, help their audiences define problems and the way the media define problems, of course, obscures other ways of considering those problems. That itself is a problem. Also, media help to forward solutions, but if they've constrained the understanding of problems, then of course the solutions that are likely to surface in the media are also themselves slightly constrained. It's one of the reasons why I believe that the media aspect of this is so critical.

I want to start with three stories that speak to three pivotal issues. One relating to the importance of audience, one to the importance of language, and one to the importance of content. The one relating to audience is a personal story. I've been an academic for years and years, but I started out my career as a photographer and a reporter, and I covered the war in El Salvador. When you cover the war in El Salvador, you're not covering the conflict as it's going on, but you're there in the aftermath. A priest calls you and says that something happened; we need you to come document it.

I was more or less just off the plane on my first trip down there, and I went with Susan Meiselis from Magnum and a few others, and we went to effectively what was a body dump. And she and I were standing next to each other, and I'm just trying basically to not lose it. We were photographing, and she finished first and then turned to see what I was doing. She said, "Susan, what the hell are you doing?" I said, "I'm just photographing here." And she said, "Put your camera up." So we put our cameras up and we looked over here, which was the most sort of graphic part of the scene in front of us. She said, "See this photograph? No one in the world is

going to publish this photograph.” Click click click. “Go another fifteen degrees. See this photograph?” It was still very graphic, but not in the severed head category. She said, “All right, maybe *Paris Match* or *Stern* or something like that is going to publish this, but no American publication is going to publish this.” Click click click. Slightly less provocative, graphic. “See this? *Mother Jones*, and some of the more alternative American periodicals are going to publish this.” Click click click. “And here you just have sort of evocative, not graphic; sort of bare feet in a little puddle and so forth. That’s the photograph that *Time* and *Newsweek* are going to publish.”

It was one of those moments where literally at the time you could see the light bulb go off over my head and I realized, hmm, reporters but also, editors make judgments about what they think their audiences need to see and are interested in seeing. It’s very much a part of the issue with – excuse me for saying this – your issues, for Islam.

Second quick story: a number of years ago, I was hired by a UN agency to look at how three different groups prioritize human rights: NGOs, government, and the media. For the most part, the UN agency believed that I would find that governments prioritized it number ten, that NGOs prioritized it number one, and that media prioritized it somewhere in the middle, depending. And that was fundamentally the case. But the much more important takeaway – I did about 70 interviews in the US and UK – turned out to be that there were different operating definitions of what human rights meant. Within about a dozen interviews, I could tell you the person’s job title by how they answered the question, what do you think about, in your job, related to human rights? They all could reference the international documents. If you pushed them, they all knew what human rights were according to the Geneva Conventions, Vienna, and so forth and so on. But that’s not how they operated. So a reporter would say, “Human rights always, in my mind, means killing – war, torture, and killing.” The head of one of the major human rights NGOs in the UK: “Human rights is the language of duty and communitarianism. We have to move from moral outrage to global responsibility.” The World Bank: “Human right is a very contentious issue in the World Bank. You have the situation where the Bank governed by its members, and many of them of course really don’t want the World Bank to dabble in human rights.”

So what is this lesson? Your belief that language is transparent and shared is not true. Language is not transparent and shared, particularly in very basic terms like human rights, like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and of course, Islam.

Third quick story: it’s not my story, it’s actually the story of Sherlock Holmes and you remember his famous short story where he has that conversation with Inspector Gregory of Scotland Yard, a less intelligent detective, about the clues over the racehorse Silver Blaze who is missing. The two men go over the facts of the case, and Inspector Gregory said, “Is there any point you want to draw my attention to?” And Sherlock Holmes says, “Yes actually; to that curious incident of the dog in the nighttime.” Gregory is puzzled, and he said, “The dog did nothing in the nighttime.” “Exactly,” said Holmes, “that was the curious incident.” He was obviously pointing up that sins of omission are at least as important as sins of commission.

In fiction, in politics, in relationships, often what is most important is what is not said. Terrorism, like human rights and Islam, is very much in the eye of the beholder and is very often used to

serve the agenda of the speaker. There is no shared legal definition of terrorism, and terrorism has been an arena in which media particularly have felt constrained. To critique the government's messages about terrorism has, at least for a very long time, though we've entered a slightly different situation in the last couple of years, but for about five or seven years after 9/11, it's been constrained because if you critique the message of terrorism there have been charges that you are effectively contemptuous of national security, contemptuous of men and women in uniform, and so forth.

To the extent that Islam has been linked to terrorism, there is the same difficulty often in calling people out on that term. So politicians, in short, have had tremendous latitude to categorize events as terrorist and individuals, groups, and even states as terrorists. Their appropriation of terms and their invention of terms – Islamo-Fascist and so forth – has been part and parcel of that trend.

Let me now move a little more specifically and talk about the coverage of Pakistan, because I think Pakistan raises some very interesting issues here. I lived there for a year and a half and have gone back frequently. With extraordinary rare exceptions, since September 2001, coverage of Pakistan in both the UK and American press has revolved around the roles that Pakistan has played in global terror, with some exceptions relating to the earthquake, for example. And it's been really interesting, on the one hand, and on the other: it's a Western ally, but it's a base of operations for Osama bin Laden. It's a regional model of moderation; it's a tinderbox for regional conflict. It's a relatively stable state under Musharraf, under the control of what was typically considered a progressive military leader, or it's a shocking backwater of religious extremism.

Now, there have been changes over time, and I've been conflating these, and we can talk about that in the questions if you're interested. But I think one of the things that's interesting is, when I lived in Pakistan, one of the things that repeatedly people from all around the country would tell me is that in Pakistan people first claim their identity by their tribe, then by being Muslim, and finally by being Pakistani. From the outside, it's almost the reverse. People are understood, the country is for the most part – again, excuse me, because I am a reporter and I do understand that media are not monolithic and I'm talking about them in that way, and I'm happy to make clarifications in the question time – but for the most part, the media have tarred the entire country with a very broad brush. And you would be familiar with this from their broadcast and print conversations about other groups; Palestinians, Iranians, and so forth.

On one hand, one could argue, I think, looking at Pakistan but also looking more broadly at coverage of Islam particularly in the Middle East, the media's coverage of Islam is part of a general trend of the media, which is a tendency to use the term as an umbrella term rather than as a specific term. Particularly in foreign policy and especially in national security issues, particularly those that deal with intelligence, media very much follow the administration, both literally and figuratively. Figuratively in terms of the messages, and literally in terms of literally being on the plane with the Secretary of State or the President, and so forth.

When there is ongoing conflict, ongoing interest in a region, as has been the case for example in the Balkans and parts of the Middle East and Pakistan and so forth, nuances do emerge. Things

aren't seen so monolithically. This is where I want to end up with a point, and it was very interesting to hear the panel from the last group. Elora Shehabuddin talked about women, and the perception of women. When there's ongoing interest in the region, there is this nuanced structure. And in those instances there are attempts to identify distinct groups within countries. You can think of Rwanda and the Hutus and Tutsis, a sort of attempt to define the good guys and the bad guys. In Kosovo, in the rest of the Balkans, again that determination.

The same thing has happened in the coverage of the war in terror as it's played out in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. And it started post-9/11, and it started with the American press and then migrated elsewhere. It started with the American press asking, why do they hate us? You all remember those cover stories: why do they hate us? It being understood, of course, who "they" were. "They" of course, also being an umbrella term. The complementary part of "why do they hate us" is there must be somebody who doesn't hate us. Who are the possible allies of that group that maybe we can convert or already converted, and we can help to get to proselytize on our behalf.

Well, as Elora mentioned, women were identified as those good Muslims, and it was through their intercession that the West would find a solution to violence. It was very interesting, and I look both quantitatively and qualitatively at media, and at print and broadcast and so forth; there were multiple frames in which women were identified as being potentially allies of the West – another problematic term. Women were seen as saviors; the transformative power of women. One of the reasons why there was so much interest specifically in women's education; because women could be transformed through education and then transform others. Women were identified as peacemakers. It was argued that they literally exercise temperance not only at the family level but on the ethnic and national levels.

Articles about women who had been victimized, through rapes and so forth, helped to cement the notion that women were good and men were bad. Women were seen effectively as sort of a canary in the minds; the health of women was a prime indicator of political and religious tolerance. And finally, there was sort of the question of, do we see women or do we not, and this is where the veil came into play so much. Women's clothing was a subject of intense interest and the veil – even in those articles where it was talked about in real terms – was often used metaphorically, and that played out very interestingly.

Let me sum up with a couple of thoughts. One of the things that we've seen in the United States is not a tremendous change over time. But we have seen, in the British press, change over time. More or less dated to the aftermath of the July 2005 bombing and then the coming into Downing Street of Brown, and what the change meant was how people looked at terrorism, they were looking at it on a local level and also the coupling of Islam and terrorism in Britain in a way that had happened less dramatically in the United States, until you come to the election and the presentation of Barack Obama as Muslim.

I think one thing that's interesting in the US case, since I think we are all at the moment residents of the United States, is in many ways it was the failure of the Bush Administration's war on terror that changed the role of Muslims in the political debate, because there is no longer, after the failure to find weapons of mass destruction, after Abu Ghraib, there's no longer the need to

demonize Muslim men, effectively what happened was the demonization of the Americans. So the compelling story was no longer how to find the Muslim good guys, it was that Americans had become the bad guys. Thank you very much.

Shireen Hunter: This brings up some of the issues that Elizabeth [Thompson] talked about gender, and democracy, and the media, and the central factor that you have to take into account is that it's power. It is power, and the connection between power and ideology. As somebody said, there is no such as thing as value-free knowledge and thank you to Susan because she mentioned that omission is sometimes even worse because people cannot make informed judgments because if I relied only on US media and wouldn't know anything about what's going on in the outside world so you really have to know several languages and surf the web and so on.

Question: Patricia Ellis. This question is directed at John Bowen. I'm just wondering if you could discuss how the different attitudes throughout Europe affect the debate on the admission of Turkey into the EU, and how you see this playing out.

Question: I also have a question for [Dr.] Bowen. You apparently wrote on why the French don't like headscarves, but I'd like to direct your attention to that level of attitudes and personal interaction. If a Muslim person visited all around Europe and then he came back and wrote that article, "why do they hate us," speaking of the Europeans, what are the kinds of attitudinal differences that you see from countries at a sort of day-to-day level?

Shireen Hunter: A couple more questions regarding Europe, and then we'll ask Susan.

Question: Last summer I was in Spain for a conference on radicalization of youth in Europe and the issue that kept coming up from the youth themselves was that they don't fit in anywhere. The Muslim youth: they're coming from Morocco, they're coming from Turkey, they don't fit into their culture there, but they've become so de-culturalized that they can't go back to Morocco or Turkey and fit in as well. I don't know if that is something that you've explored or if that is something that we might tend think about more in terms of identity crisis with the youth because part of the issue was that radicalization of course comes from not belonging and not being connected. To the extent that I heard many people that were from Turkey saying that when they went back to Turkey, Turkish Islam was much more liberalized in some ways because in Europe many of the Muslim communities were so ghetto-ized and insulated and incubated that they don't even get to grow with the kinds of interactions they have in their own home countries, which are growing and changing in more dynamic ways than those Muslim communities are.

John Bowen: I'll start with the last one, I might have a little more to say on that one. I'm reminded of a friend of mine who's a French convert to Islam who was talking about a couple of guys who had grown up outside of Paris. They were Muslims, and they had this big argument over whether it was okay to wear socks while praying and it went on and on. And so they said, "Well, let's ask Bin Baaz (who was still alive at that time) the mufti in Saudi Arabia. They sent a letter to his organization in Saudi Arabia, and they said, we'll get the real story from Saudi Arabia. And the reply was, what planet are you living in? Who cares? This is backing up what you have to say.

The coming of age in the 1980s in many Western European societies of women and men who had been born to parents who had themselves come from a majority Muslim country, and their sense of not belonging anywhere and not being sure where they were was really critical in shifting things. I remember talking to one woman, a Berber speaker from Algeria, and she said, I grew up here always thinking I was an Algerian, and I'd go back to Algeria wearing clothes I'd be used to wearing in France, and have stones thrown at me, being yelled at as a French woman. So she had this crisis. A lot of the result of this, we're not going to be Algerian, we're not going to fit in here, was after the attempt in '82 and '83 to do what all earlier immigrant groups had done after equal rights, and that didn't work. So one option was to say, no, we're Muslim. And we happen to live here. In Britain it was a bit different because there the struggle had been also for equal rights but as blacks, and this was a racial and ethnic-based struggle that continued a bit longer, but then again by the late '80s, Muslims, if they hadn't already decided "our main identity is as Muslims" they were forced to by the famous fatwa, (many of my students think "fatwa" means death sentence") on [Salman] Rushdie and other things happening at just the end of the '80s.

Now there's a new generation, and they're seeking very creative ways of working through these identity issues, very different ways. Some of them pick the avenue of artistic expression; we were talking about Islamic hip-hop last night, for example, or a deep inquiry into religion.

The other question I have much to say about is if a Muslim from North Africa were to walk around Europe. Well, in France, he'd be assumed to be a North African, and he'd be categorized as such, and the fact that he'd been born in Algeria wouldn't make any difference. If he wandered into England, people might not be quite so sure who he is; he doesn't look Pakistani; he's not white; there wouldn't be such a clear categorization as in other countries. I think it would be anywhere from a racist attitude to puzzlement across the board.

Talking about Turkey, of course it is a puzzle because on the one hand, what with the change in government and the controversies within Turkey, there's been wonder in Europe about the commitment to secularization. The other hand, with the rule and the government, there's been pathways toward greater observance of human rights. They're doing all the things that European states are supposed to do to get entry into Turkey. I'm not an expert; there are probably people here who are in political science and international relations who think much more about this than I do. The real resistance doesn't come on the level of thinking about the politics of the Turkish government, it's really more, there are all these Muslims over there; if they all become part of Europe it will change the character of Europe. And the debate about the European constitution a few years ago, whether there should be reference to the Christian heritage: I think on that level, the sense is of masses of people rather than having to do with particular governmental policy.

Shireen Hunter: I did work on Muslim communities in Europe and published a book. There are two things I cannot help but emphasize (also I lived and traveled in these areas and saw the progress). One thing is that you should not underestimate the impact of racism. I was a student in England when the first wave of sub-continental – I would say – immigrants came, and this was the time of Enoch Powell and so on. So – with all the apologies for our Pakistani friends – the term, "paki-bashing" started before there was a madrasa. The other thing was at the Cite University in Paris: the candidates of so-called "diversite" the socialists were defeated, and

socialists voted for the other candidates for the Gaullist candidate because the Gaullist candidates were the sous-française as Brigitte Bardot likes to say whereas the others were not African. So the element of racism we should not underestimate.

The other thing that has come up continuously – and by the way, here you should read *Reformist Voices of Islam*¹ and there is a section on Europe – and that explains rejection: the element of constant rejection that says that it's no matter what you do; as one of the preachers says, “you cannot be pork-eating, wine-drinking Muslims because, even if you eat pork and drink wine, [you are still Muslim]. And this is why there's a younger generation that are second and third generation that supposedly should have more assimilation, actually have less, There was an interesting movie called, “My Son, the Radical”. It's a story of a young Muslim who actually forces his more liberal parents and it is because they blame their parents, saying, “You have been too submissive.”

And now please, questions for Susan Moeller.

Question: I'm just wondering, we're talking about the youth, and there are so many new sources of information for young people. They're not using the traditional sources of information, and I'm wondering how this is positive or negative in terms of our knowledge and understanding of Islam.

Question: This is on Susan's comments about audience and editorial decisions, and it goes back to our discussion this morning. Editors make decisions both at the level of newspapers but also who gets published and who gets press. So how are we scholars and academics supposed to assess popular perceptions about Islam and terrorism and women's rights, etc., so it's sort of a broader question. It's something that we've been talking about all day but I wanted to bring it up because you brought up another editorial decision.

Question: Speaking about entry points: I am personally thinking about a blog in which historians as a consortium would actually get together openly to think about how to connect what we know to public policy decisions. Does that sort of thing fall into obscurity? What does one do? But also, thinking about the counter-culture: you said *Mother Jones* would publish such and such picture but not in, you know, *Newsweek*, and I was thinking particularly about the wave of movies, particularly in the 80s in Europe. Everybody remembers “My Beautiful Launderette” about a friendship between an Englishman and a Pakistani man. There was another one about grandmothers and their dreams, “Bhaji on the Beach” which was wonderful but also “La Haine” in France. What happens to those? Should one put one's effort into alternative media? Do these things go by the wayside or is there an accumulative effect?

Question: A bit of the last thing about where are things going; we were talking in the earlier panel about the results of the Gallup poll, etc., and in the Muslim world, their own perceptions, including of us (whoever “we” are, leaving aside all those languages which we'll take as a given). What do we know about what is shaping their perceptions. I guess the part I'm missing is, similar to the conversation we're having here about what we get, and I wonder what they get because that also similarly is shaping whatever it is that these polls are reflecting.

¹ *Reformist Voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity* by Shireen T. Hunter

Susan Moeller: I'll take these in the order in which they came. The one about youth and digital media; there are large swaths of the world including the Arab world and the Muslim world which have broadband connectivity such as we're familiar with in Europe and the United States, but there's a lot that don't and so we need to talk about what kind of media is going to access what youth.

But it is increasingly important, and there are increasingly savvy uses of digital media, and I'll just give you one example from the Israeli-Hezbollah war. The Hezbollah leadership was very savvy – not only about how text messages could get its message out to communities that had interrupted coverage by landline and cable TV and so forth, so they had various means of viral text messaging – but there also was a return to community-based watching of media, so that you had coffee shops and so forth in Beirut, for example, where there were major efforts to get a TV in working order so that the entire community would gather in front of the TV, across lines that would have been more ethnically divided prior to that conflict. And depending on how you're looking at both of those situations, you can see media as a problem in exacerbating and speaking to sort of ethnic divisions, but you can also see it as crossing ethnic and religious and other divisions for nationalist purposes. And there are many other instances of that.

The blogging: it's no longer true that if you build it they will come. There's too much out there already, and building it is not the way to go anymore, which is not to say that there's no reason for your organization or you as an individual to create a blog. For personal speech purposes, you might want to do that. But far better to find a way to aggregate many voices and to have those voices, when they're aggregated, to think about who you're really trying to reach and what you're trying to tell them. Because very often some of the things you're trying to tell them, the audience is not interested in hearing. You have to find a way to get to that audience, which is in line with the question of how do academics who do have something to say and can really add to the conversation by adding entirely new chunks or making more nuanced and more complex arguments than are currently out there, and how do you deal with that?

One way is, the media that currently exists, even mainstream media, is increasingly becoming permeable to people who are not formally journalists. So for example, *Foreign Policy* magazine has won all kinds of awards, it's won for the best website and so forth. I blog for that, and the reason I blog for it is that they identified me as doing academic studies that were potentially of interest to their audience. And the same thing is true with even *The New York Times* and other very mainstream sites, which are increasingly bringing in and creating blogs and other forums. I would suggest to both academics and to NGOs, to try to identify existing sites that are already speaking to a community who may not be educated about this subject but you think could use the information you have to give. And we can talk differently about journals and so forth.

The very last comment about the polls and shaping perception; there have been a number of polls. Shibley Telhami was here last night at a reception and some of the polling that he's done with Gallup and some of the he's worked with Gallup and so forth; some of the work that Steve Coll has done with PIPA (Program in International Policy Attitudes) and the BBC has gotten at some of these questions about how are perceptions shaped. You're right, this is increasingly important for youth, to understand the new demographic, and it's a little bit like the election we

just had. The polling definitely got better at identifying how young adults were going to vote than they had in previous elections. They had figured out how to get to people with cell phones rather than landlines for example. But it's not a perfect system yet.

John Bowen: There are really interesting findings of Pew polls on European attitudes toward Islam, and there's a really interesting question: Can Islam be part of modern society? It was given to people all over the world. But the French responded – this is a representative sample of French people – much more positively to that question than the Brits or the Spanish or the Jordanians, as I remember, or the Pakistanis. So why is that the case? Well, a couple of films here; films can help. There's been for a long time a sense that the problems in France aren't Islam, they're mad kids in the poor outer cities. “La Haine” of course, was about some adolescents who get into trouble and they get – [the title means] “hatred” – and they go crazy. Vincent Cassel who was the lead is a white French guy. So it wasn't about Muslims or immigrants or anything else.

There's a more positive, much more recent film called *L'Esquive*. I don't if anyone knows it; it sort of means avoiding, getting around. It's the story of a bunch of kids living in one of these poor outer cities, and in school they're putting on a play by [Pierre] Marivaux, a classic French playwright and they do it in perfect classic French and they just have it down perfectly. And then on the outside they're speaking this really difficult to understand slang, it was subtitled in France in fact. There's a little bit about police harassment but it's not a big deal. The group is, you know, a mixed ethnic kind of group. It was a big hit. The media, I think, acted fairly responsibly in this case. These and other movies show these issues of youth culture, problems in the poor suburbs, etc. in a way that doesn't equate Islam with being poor or being anything else, and I think might explain the real clearly statistical difference between how French people think about Islam as a religion and how the responders in England or Spain or elsewhere do.