Susan King: Karen was on the board with me when we started an organization called the International Women’s Media Foundation, which this year gave awards to a number of powerful women. This is the sixteenth year we’ve done it, but unfortunately, most people know about us because the woman we recognized in 2002, in Russia, was killed just about a month ago. It stands up for the kind of journalism that many of us in Washington felt was really important. Not that you just put yourself on the front lines, but that you spoke the truth. Speaking the truth can be just as dangerous as covering wars. Karen is a woman who was always a reporter that everyone admired, and an editor that was even better than the reporter because editors are often feared and loathed in Washington, and I never heard anyone say anything bad about her. When she said she was going to write this book, I said, “I would love to give you a book party in New York.” Pat, who is one of our grantees, has a fabulous series going on around Islam scholarship with some of the scholars that are recognized here at Carnegie Corporation of New York, and she has the best network in New York, and a different network. Many of you have never been here before and we really want to welcome you.

I just want to tell you the other thing that sort of binds us women together is that Karen is also the mother of adopted children from Paraguay. I have one, she has two, and when I was adopting, she was there for me in a way that was very powerful. That’s one of the things that’s great about women who care about the world in all those different ways.

Now that I have your attention, I want to introduce Pat and just say, she started this as a volunteer and as a producer for MacNeil Lehrer, and wanted to bring foreign policy voices together from women from lots of different standpoints: those working in consulates, those working as journalists, those working in the State Department, those working in the think tanks. She put together a network that is really quite unique, and then moved it here to New York. And when she was thinking about this I said to Pat- she was also one of those founding members of the International Women’s Media Foundation- I said, “Pat, you’ve got a non-profit here.” And fifteen years later, she’s running this organization with a lot of power, a lot more power than it had, and she took that risk of being an
entrepreneur to start a non-profit, which is not easy to do. I think with that, I’ll introduce Pat Ellis.

**Pat Ellis:** Thank you. It’s so wonderful to be here. We have done other events here, and it’s a gathering of friends. Susan, thank you so much for all your support on both a personal and professional level. Susan was there encouraging me all the time to make this into a full-time non-profit. It was just a volunteer side thing that I was doing, and here we are today, and it’s just absolutely wonderful. I want to thank Susan for all her support, I want to thank Carnegie for allowing us to meet in this gorgeous location, and for bringing us all together, and thank Karen for coming up from Washington. This is part of our mixing it up between New York and Washington, which I feel that we need more of, particularly at this point in time, so anything we can do to contribute to that is absolutely wonderful.

Also, Susan has been so supportive over the years encouraging us to go forward and also supporting us on these wonderful series we’re doing with Carnegie Scholars. The most recent one, which we hope to continue, was on the role of Islam. We just had the most exciting speakers who allowed us expand to our knowledge by putting things in a historical, cultural, political, as well as “what happened yesterday” context. The last one, for example, was a gentleman who had gone to a madrassa and talked about what it was like inside madrasas, and he went back to visit and brought a video revisiting this place where he had spent his youth. It was absolutely amazing. We’re really, really grateful.

There are some new people here today. What we’re all about, basically, is promoting women’s leadership, women’s voices, and global engagement, and so our speakers are Americans and they’re also people from every different part of the world. We just had an event honoring the President of Liberia. This year we’ve had some foreign ministers: the Deputy Foreign Minister from Egypt and the Croatian Foreign Minister. It’s really exciting to hear firsthand from these amazing women, and there are more and more of them now, so that’s the good news.

It’s also a thrill to have Karen here. Karen and I go way back; when I was at MacNeil Lehrer there were three women journalists who would appear at every conference, and it was Karen, and I was there, and Karen Elliot House. Remember those days? So we go way back, and Karen has always been so generous with her time and has been a great friend of the Women’s Foreign Policy Group, from way back when. She spoke to us about Cuba, about news coverage of foreign affairs, and most recently she spoke about the new leadership in Latin America. It’s been wonderful working together with her, and I heard she was writing this book, and just like Susan, I said, Ok, whenever this is finished, you have to come and speak to us. It certainly could not be timelier. Everyone is interested to get the behind-the-scenes scoop about Colin Powell, who has held the highest leadership positions one could imagine, from Joint Chiefs of Staff to National Security Advisor to Secretary of State. Everyone is very interested in why he made the decisions he did, from the U.N. to his not running for presidency.
Karen has spent most of her career at the Washington Post and she’s currently Associate Editor covering terrorism, so that’s quite a beat. She worked for almost three years on this book. At that time she was at another Carnegie, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, but Karen has been the London Bureau Chief, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, and Bureau Chief in Latin America, and she’s received all kinds of awards, and so we’re really lucky to have her.

Before we begin, a special thanks to all the Carnegie people who are here, and I want to particularly mention Philip for all his help, and Patti, who were just really great in getting this all together. And Emily, my colleague, who really has worked hard to make this all happen. We have a great group representing so many different backgrounds. We do have some diplomats here today. I know the Austrian Consul General is here, I’m not sure if the ambassador of New Zealand has arrived. And we have representatives of different consulates, so I know we have the Canadian Consulate, and I’m not sure the others have arrived. In any event, without further ado, please join me in welcoming Karen DeYoung.

Karen DeYoung: Thank you so much, and thank you to Susan. It’s great to be here with these two women. They’re right; we go way, way back. Certainly in Washington, when Susan was in Washington, and thank you for hosting this today. And to you Pat. Pat is one of my idols, because she has managed to bring together so many different disciplines, specifically focusing on women. I have to say, as a journalist covering foreign policy, I learned quite some time ago that the disadvantages of not being part of the boys’ network and the kinds of links that men seem to make among themselves are so increasingly outweighed by the networks that you can make among women, increasingly in foreign policy. As you see, we have a lot of people here who are in foreign policy for different countries, and I find overseas, it really is true that for my own mercenary journalistic purposes, you can form a bond with women. You see what men have been doing all these years, and it actually works.

I’m just going to talk very briefly and I hope you’ll have a lot of questions. What I’ve found as I’ve gone around talking about this book, and to me it’s one of the things that held my interest about Colin Powell, is that different audiences come at him from completely different directions. Some people want to know about what happened in the Bush administration and what his role is, and we can certainly talk about that. A large portion of the book is devoted to that. Other audiences want to know about his life as a black man and his life as a soldier. That’s one of the most interesting things to me, and I’m going to sketch a sort of broad overview and you can come at it from any direction that you want.

I had a strange experience yesterday. It was one of my rare visits to the gym yesterday afternoon, I was on the treadmill and kind of staring at the TV and there was a talk show on CNN and they were talking about third party tickets, and the history of third party candidacy, and looking toward the future. The discussion was on a ticket for 2008 with Colin Powell and Barack Obama, which I found amazing. The fact that there was a serious discussion and it was never mentioned that one is a Republican and one is a Democrat. It was never mentioned that they’re both black men. And in Powell’s case,
there was no mention of the fact that he had been a major player in an administration where some of his policies are some of the most reviled in American history, and if we believe the polls, the vast majority of people disagree with what this administration, of which Colin Powell is a part, has done.

Alma Powell used to say, certainly in 1995 when Powell was thinking of running for president, and she said it to me when I interviewed her several times for the book, “People think everybody loves Colin Powell. Well, everybody does not love Colin Powell.” And I think that’s probably a little bit truer than it was in 1995 when he was thinking of running for president. She was putting it in the context of his color, and she always thought he was very naïve about the willingness of the American public to allow a black man to be president, and said that no matter how much they tell you they love you now, when they go into the polling booth, they won’t vote for you. And also, she was obviously very much concerned about the fact that somebody might take a shot at him.

But clearly many people do love Colin Powell, and still love him. I think there is that dichotomy about him: he’s still America’s hero, the man on the white horse, but he’s also the good soldier who allowed himself to be used for ends that were not so good, in the view of a lot of people. And that’s what I set out to understand, as I started researching this book. Over the course of two years, it took me to hundreds of interviews with people currently in the White House, and previously in various White Houses that he had worked with, and the intelligence community, the Pentagon, obviously the State Department. It took me to tiny villages in Jamaica where many of his family members still live and where his parents came from, a little village called Tophill in western Jamaica; to the now mean streets of the Bronx- they weren’t quite as mean when he was growing up there; to army posts across the country, a lot of presidential libraries, and the National Archives and Powell’s own papers, which are at the National Defense University in Fort McNair in Washington, at least the unclassified papers, where all the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have their papers.

Powell’s are unusual there. As you walk through the stacks you see the various chairmen, and you get to him, and it’s row upon row upon row, at least a thousand boxes. What I’ve found is that he is such a pack rat, I think he must have the ticket stub for every movie he’s ever gone to in his life. His wife, I believe, told him to get some of this stuff out of the house, and so it was really a treasure trove of both policy papers from the Reagan administration and from the first Bush administration, and also just things about his life: personal correspondence, all kinds of things. I was very lucky, and he actually gave me permission to go through them; you can’t go through these papers without the permission of their owner.

I think he’s the man who, perhaps more than any other public figure of our time, is a product of the confluence of major streams of events in the twentieth century: the vast flow of immigrants in the early part of the twentieth century- his parents came from Jamaica, the struggles and successes and failures of the civil rights movement, and the transformation of the U.S. military through World War II, Vietnam, the Cold War. What I tried to do was place his life in the context of all of those streams as a way of
understanding the phenomenon that he came to be and why he made some of the decisions that he made in his life, and particularly in the Bush administration.

In the course of doing my research, I also interviewed Powell five times in his office in the State Department. I’m sure many of you have been there. The State Department’s seventh floor is filled with early American heirloom furniture and it has very thick carpets. It’s a pretty impressive place. The entryway to the Secretary of State’s office is a big reception room that’s filled with eighteenth-century American antiques, but the Secretary’s office itself is quite small. It’s kind of an unassuming room, especially when you compare it to the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the Pentagon, the Defense Secretary’s office, or even something like the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, which is this huge, wonderful place with a fabulous view.

The Secretary of State’s office is kind of womb-like, almost, by comparison. Except for the desk and some period armchairs, it’s furnished with the same dark brown leather sofas that you find in U.S. embassies around the world. The windows were very small, covered with heavy curtains, and he had a little lamp on his desk. He had two paintings of his heroes on the walls: Thomas Jefferson and George Marshall. There were small family pictures on the bookshelves and some of the mementos that he’s carried around throughout his career, most of them from the military. Every time I talked to him in that office, there was always at least one aide present; usually it was Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary for Communications. They had tape recorders and I had a tape recorder, although no questions were off the record, and the only condition that Powell imposed was that nothing that he said would be used for anything before the book was published.

The last time I interviewed him for the book, in March of 2005, he had left the State Department and moved into an office in a private building across the Potomac River in Alexandria, Virginia. It was the top floor of a building housing America’s Promise, which was the organization to help disadvantaged youth that he had founded after he left the military and before he went back into public service. That office was opulent by comparison to his State Department cubbyhole. It was very big; it had huge picture windows and a spectacular view of the Capitol and the Washington Monument in the distance. Everything was there: his paintings of the buffalo soldiers, the little marble pen and pencil set that he got in 1957 for being the best cadet at summer camp in ROTC. But the office itself seemed very sterile and silent, and Powell himself seemed very wary and nervous, alone without the trappings of high office. He spent a few very awkward moments trying to get this little tape recorder he had to work; he couldn’t figure out how to do it. So he finally sort of threw it down on the table in irritation, and I said, Look, I’m going to make a transcript and I’ll send you a copy.

We chatted a little while about what he was up to. He said he wasn’t planning on writing a book; he’d already told what he considered to be his good stories in his autobiography. It’s a very good book if some of you have read it. It’s kind of a travel through his youth and anecdotally through his military career. He thought that nobody wanted to read about
the day-to-day life of a government official, and he certainly was not about to tell tales about the Bush administration.

He was clearly irritated at that point—and again this was two or three months after he had left office—at the rash of news analyses of his tenure, most of which either sharply criticized him as someone who had failed to live up to his potential and had willingly helped the administration head into what by that time had become a fairly disastrous war, or speculated that he must be distraught over the way things had turned out for him. And then he answered a question that I hadn’t really asked him. “Why am I distraught?” he said. “We’re working on our relationships. Look at what we’ve done, with Russia, China, NATO, the EU. Remember, this administration came in saying, we’ve got to get out of Bosnia. And it was Colin Powell who went in there and said, ‘We went in together, we come out together.’ It took three months before the president could say it, but I staunched that wound until he could heal it. That’s what we’ve done. Afghanistan? I’m the one who got the Pakistanis to go along with it. Everybody hated the roadmap. Nobody would ever use the word and now it’s the flavor of the month. Six-party framework on North Korea? The EU initiative on Iran? I was the one who said let’s work with these guys. And now we’re having meetings to see how we can do more with this process.” He was the one who had fought to send U.S. troops to Liberia, he said, and an international force to Haiti. He had fought for and won the largest increase in U.S. foreign aid since the Marshall Plan, and he’d focused the administration’s attention and resources on the global HIV/AIDS problem. And he’d restored the workforce and the budget and the morale of the State Department.

The interesting thing about that—it really was a diatribe—was that he never mentioned Iraq. He had placed all of his accomplishments in the context of battles inside the administration, and many of the things he cited as victories had been compromised by the very struggles it had taken to win them. The administration’s policies on the Middle East and North Korea had ended up more or less where he had hoped they would be in 2001, but much had been lost in the process. And yet it was Iraq that overshadowed everything. It was in fact the one issue on which much of his legacy, in addition to the administration, would be based, and it was not likely that history’s judgment would be kind. For the rest of his life and beyond, he would be known as the Secretary who went against America to support launching a war that he himself did not really believe was necessary.

Let me just take you back a few minutes to 1995, two years after Powell retired from his 35-year career in the Army, to understand just how popular and overwhelming a figure he was in American culture. He was, by a whole range of polls, the most trusted and respected American in the country. On polls worldwide he was up there with Mahatma Gandhi and literally just under Jesus Christ. He was a hero of the Persian Gulf War, he was a black man held in high esteem by all races. His autobiography had sold a million copies just a few weeks after it came out. One can only dream of such sales. His very existence made Americans feel good about themselves and about their country.

It’s hard to imagine in today’s polarized world, but Powell seemed to transcend party politics. The year before the 1996 presidential election, virtually every newspaper and
magazine in the country ran major features about him and had him repeatedly on their front pages with speculation that he would challenge Bill Clinton for the presidency in '96. There were a lot of Democrats who wanted him to replace Al Gore as Clinton’s running mate and he’d already turned down two offers from Clinton to be Clinton’s Secretary of State. Republican polls and the Democratic White House’s own internal polling indicated that if he ran as a Republican, he could possibly beat the sitting president. Clinton himself thought that Powell was the only person that could beat him.

Like a lot of military people, Powell took great pride in not belonging to a political party. He’d voted for Ronald Regan and George H.W. Bush, but he’d also voted for Jimmy Carter, LBJ, and John F. Kennedy. He was a registered Independent. Whether most Americans would in fact have pulled the lever for a black man will always be a mystery, but at the time, the majority of Americans of all colors and both political parties told pollsters that their votes were his for the asking.

I think Powell clearly wanted to be president. Despite the fears of his family and the negative advice of his closest friends, as he neared the deadline that he had set for himself for making a decision, he actually wrote out a speech declaring his candidacy for the nomination. And when you read it, it’s a very long speech, and he talks about how he knows the American people wanted change, they wanted a government that was smaller and more responsive; they wanted strong defense and a conservative fiscal policy. That was the Republican side of him. But he also spoke about very liberal social views; he supported affirmative action and a woman’s right to choose. That was the Democratic side of him.

But the same polls that showed he had a very good chance of winning a general election indicated that he would have trouble getting the nomination from either party. State primaries of course, then as now, were run by activists of the parties, and clearly the Democrats were going to stick with Clinton and the Republican party was his only realistic option, but even there, the party was heading very quickly toward the right. This was the year after the upset in the midterm elections where the Republicans took fifty-some seats in the House. It was a contract with America, and they were dead set against him. Various conservative groups had press conferences and said, over our dead body. This man will not be our candidate.

So while Powell clearly wanted to be president, but the idea of running for office, of combating this kind of challenge from the right was clearly repugnant to him. The idea of asking people for money he couldn’t stand. The idea of compromising, in a political sense, he couldn’t stand. And at the last minute, he pulled back. He had a press conference in late '95 that some of you will remember, where he said he would not be a candidate, but, surprising a lot of people certainly in his own family, where most people were Democrats, he said he was going to join the Republican party.

At the time he thought that he would become a political activist; he wanted to leave the door open for 2000. He thought that he could bring the party back to what he thought it should be: a centrist party, Rockefeller Republicans, a moderate party. Again, strong
defense, fiscal conservatism, and liberal social policies. The fact was that he didn’t do that, and he didn’t even try. By the time the 2000 election approached he’d long since lost interest, and that race, as we all know, went to George W. Bush.

Powell favored John McCain in 2000, and once McCain was vanquished in the Super Tuesday primaries, he then migrated toward Bush the younger. At the time, you’ll recall, it was hailed as a stroke of genius by Bush. There were fears that the Texas governor was ignorant of foreign affairs and that he would be a tool of the party’s right wing. Powell wanted the job, and he thought that he would be perfect for it. It didn’t require the kind of political pandering that had turned him away from elected office.

Four years later, Bush won reelection and Powell, the Secretary of State, was basically thrown out. He didn’t get a handshake; he didn’t even get a thank you from the president. He’d invested over four years all of his political and personal capital in the president, who he called “Sonny.” Bush had spent all that capital, and then had dropped him. The end was an inelegant phone call from the White House Chief of Staff Andy Card a week after the election. “The president wants to make a change,” Card told him. He expected Powell’s resignation letter within two days, on Friday the twelfth of November. When Powell went home he didn’t tell anybody, except Rich Armitage, his deputy and closest friend. He went home and typed a letter himself, on his home computer, and the White House later sent it back, saying it had a typo in it and could he please re-do it. On the following Monday, his resignation was announced, and the next day, his successor was announced, Bush’s National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

What I tried to do was explain how Powell arrived at the pinnacle of popularity and trust in this country, and then ultimately became an object of scorn for a lot of people, and pity for others. There’s no doubt that he was the odd man out in the Bush administration, and the question remaining about him for a lot of people is why such a proud and accomplished person put up with it. Why didn’t he quit? A lot of people felt Powell had betrayed them and the country, lending his prestige and reputation to an unworthy administration and an ignoble cause, certainly with the war in Iraq. Others believed that he’d been duped by the administration; that he was the one who’d been betrayed; that he was used to build support for the conflict on the basis of evidence he did not know was false and was then discarded after he’d served his purpose. Still others, primarily on the far right of the Republican party, said good riddance to him. They saw his doubts about the war as disloyalty, and a lot of them blamed him for what went wrong.

Part of the answer for why Powell stayed on, I think, is the obvious one: he’s a soldier. He’d risen to high station in life by obeying orders and making his boss look good. He’s a man who’s used to working inside, not outside of institutions. But there are other reasons: a self-confidence that at times bordered on arrogance and a career that had given him little experience with failure. He simply never grasped the extent of his isolation within the administration. He agreed with most of his staff that his departure would remove the last remaining impediment to policies he was convinced would be even worse. At the same time, he equated even thinking about resignation as defeat, and while others may have seen him as defeated, he refused to admit it to himself.
After the release of his resignation letter, Powell saw Bush regularly over a period of two months before the inauguration. He went back and forth to the Oval Office for all the regular meetings and Bush never spoke to him about his departure. They never had a conversation. Eventually the White House contacted his office to schedule what they called a farewell call for all the departing cabinet secretaries. As the meeting approached— it was scheduled for the thirteenth of January, a week before the inauguration—the White House called Powell’s office and asked for talking points for the meeting. It really was the final indignity, that the president needed notes to think of what to say, after four years, in a conversation with his highest-ranking cabinet officer.

Powell was there in the Oval Office that morning, and Tony Blair was visiting, he was there for the meeting. After Blair and his people left, Powell stayed on, and Bush seemed puzzled as Andy Card left the room, and said, “Andy, where are you going?” And Powell cleared his throat and said, “Mr. President, I think this is supposed to be our farewell call.” And Bush said, “Oh, is that why Condi ain’t here?” And Powell said, “Yeah, that’s probably the reason.” Because she had always been there for every other meeting they’d had about policy. They had a few minutes of chitchat, and Powell had already decided he was going to unload in a way that he never had over the previous four years.

He said the war in Iraq was going south and that the president had little time to turn it back around. He said if things had not changed substantially by April—and remember, this was again 2005—that the chances would be almost nil. He said yes, there was an election coming up January thirtieth, but the idea that that would change the dynamic on the ground was ludicrous. The administration had had hopes before that various movement in the direction of democracy would change things: when it set up a new legal framework for Iraq, when it had turned over some portion of power to hand-picked Iraqis, when they’d found Saddam Hussein and arrested him, and yet every time those hopes had been dashed. Powell said there would be a window of about two months to start to see some progress, but again, he said if by the first of April things have not changed in some way, then I think you really have a problem.

He said elections and talking about democracy would not stop it, that only the Iraqi army could do that, and it was unclear whether they would ever succeed. Powell had argued throughout, since the invasion of Iraq, that really only the security situation mattered; that if they couldn’t get the security situation right, it didn’t matter if they had elections; it didn’t matter how much they talked about democracy. And he said the problem with the Iraqi army is that despite all the training, they really didn’t believe in what they were fighting for. He had seen the same problem in Vietnam, where the troops ceased to believe in what they were fighting for.

He also warned Bush about serious internal problems in his own administration. These were problems that had gone on for a long time that Powell had really not addressed with Bush. He said that the power that the president had given to the Pentagon to meddle in diplomacy on issues as widespread as North Korea, Iraq, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, along with poisoned personal relationships between people in the State Department and
the Defense Department, were seriously undermining administration policy. And Bush waved his hand and dismissed it. It wasn’t very different, he said, from what had happened with Weinberger and Schultz in the Reagan administration. Powell said he didn’t think so. He had been there, as Weinberger’s military aide, and he thought this was something completely different. In that administration, you had the two cabinet secretaries who basically couldn’t stand each other, and their staffs underneath basically figured things out. In this administration the enmity on both sides went all the way down, from the secretaries to their deputies to the undersecretaries to the assistant secretaries.

When they finished the session, they shook hands and Secretary Powell went back to the State Department and he walked in and his Chief of Staff asked him how it had gone and Powell said, “You know, that was really strange. I don’t think the president even knew why I was there.”

The amazing thing about Powell is that he has managed to redeem himself in the eyes of many Americans. He’s in very high demand as a speaker around the country and thousands of people turn out to listen to him. Every once in a while, there’ll be a small little demonstration of people with signs that say, you know, “You should have quit” or “War criminal” or whatever, but very rarely. In his public statement he still allows very little daylight between himself and the Bush administration. He’s talked about how he had proposed increasing the size of the invasion force for Iraq and that he thought a better post-war plan was needed. He’s publicly criticized the White House detainee and interrogation policies, one of the few issues on which he spoke out quite strenuously while he was on the inside.

He knows people are waiting for him to vent his spleen about those four years, but other than occasionally in his sessions with me, he’s not done so, and I don’t think he will. For every anguished and angry comment from him, there are many others who feel like he let the country down and has emerged as a lesser man, that he was someone who, on a number of occasions, had the opportunity to change the course of history and decided not to take that opportunity.

Thank you.

Pat Ellis: Thank you so much, Karen. I’m just going to open it up very quickly with a question. In October, just before Powell got the word that he was resigning, I went to the Africare dinner in Washington and he was present. We were talking, and he was talking, as though he was going to stay on. I’m just wondering how surprised he was by all this and then also, if you can segue into his relationship with Condi, because I just think that we know about the dissention with Cheney and Rumsfeld, and she has been able to implement a number of the things that he had on his agenda.

Karen DeYoung: I think very early on in the first Bush administration, it was clear to Powell that he was not going to stay for a second term. And that certainly came home around 2003. It was not only Iraq, it was a whole serious of issues. In fact, Iraq was probably the least of it, from his point of view. It was the Middle East, it was Kyoto, and
it was the prisoner policy. He felt not only were his views not being listened to but that the whole structure of decision-making within the administration was offensive to his sense of order.

I mean, this is a guy who went into the Reagan administration in 1987 as the Deputy National Security Advisor and then a year later as the National Security Advisor, right after Iran-Contra, and went in as a General, and said, “This is what we’re going to do. We’re going to have meetings of the National Security Council, we’re going to have agendas on paper, everybody’s going to have a turn to talk, the meeting’s going to start at this time and end at that time, at the end of it we’re going to write down everything that was said and circulate it to everybody so you know, decision memorandums are going to go in writing to the president, and then the president’s going to make a choice and he’s going to sign it. And then you’re all going to know what happened.”

The process was somewhat different in the elder Bush administration, but still basically, you had the system where everybody got the chance to say what they thought and the decisions were made with everyone sitting there. It was completely different in this administration. They had meetings, they didn’t really have debates, but decisions were never made at those meetings. Decisions seemed to come out of nowhere, and did not reflect what the substance of the conversations had been, at least in Powell’s view, and the view of others in the State Department and in other places in the administration.

He was ready to go. He felt like four years was enough. But he never told Bush that. He never said it definitively to anybody. And as the election approached in 2004, it was one of those periods, you’ll recall, that come along every once in a while, like now, where people said, “Oh Rumsfeld, he’s never going to last, he’s gotta go.” And there were lots of rumors that Rumsfeld was going to be the one to leave. And for Powell that was good news, even though he saw Cheney as more the center of his problems and policy problems than Rumsfeld, but as a soldier, he was very upset at the way the Pentagon was being run. He was leaving, Yasser Arafat was about to die, which would open a window, he thought, in the Middle East. There were going to be these elections in Iraq on the thirtieth of January, and Powell started to think, as the election approached that maybe he would stay on in a sort of transition role if Rumsfeld was gone. Six months, another year; that would allow him to go out on a high; that he would have prevailed. The roadmap was sort of in play and Arafat wouldn’t be there, so there was room for progress in the Middle East. He basically got to the point where he expected to be asked to stay on, and he was intending to accept.

After the election, that weekend, Bush said, we’re going up to Camp David, Andy and Condi and I, and we’re going to look over the cabinet. Usually at the end of a term, the president asks all the former cabinet people to write out pro forma resignations, and then he decides which ones he’s going to take. But he said, no, no, we don’t want anybody to write resignations, that’s fine. And Powell actually believed that he was going to get a call saying, we hope you’ll stay, for another at least six months and probably a year. In fact, that was not the call he got. Rumsfeld was staying, and he got the call that I described, saying, the president has decided to make a change.
The question about Condi… Alma Powell’s family had known the Rice family for a long time. Alma’s father was the principal of the largest black high school in Birmingham, Alabama, and her uncle was the principal of the second-largest high school. There may have only been two, actually. Condi Rice’s father was the guidance counselor at the second high school, where Alma Powell’s uncle was the principal. So the two families knew each other. In fact, I think Condi’s uncle had actually gone out at one time with Alma Powell’s sister. So they knew each other.

When Powell was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the first Bush administration, and Condi was a relatively junior person on the National Security Council staff, they knew each other. I think there was the racial affinity, in the sense that at least they were in the minority so they sort of gravitated together, but I think he thought of her more as a daughter than a colleague. She clearly was very smart, and they stayed in touch over the years. When she would come to Washington, she would go and have dinner with him.

I think that when she became the National Security Advisor, he basically expected her to do the job the way he had done it, in a very organized fashion: everybody gets their chance to talk, everything’s out in the open, all options are explored, and he felt that she did not do that. That she in fact was overwhelmed by these powerful figures on the NSC, that she was not pushing all advice on Bush; she was basically telling him what he wanted to hear, and allowing others to come in and speak to him in an ex parte fashion outside of the principals meetings where all these foreign policy issues were supposed to be decided.

**Question:** Is it his perception, or yours, that Condi allied herself with the Cheneys and the Rumsfelds because of her own interests, her own career, or is it because she really believed in that choice, for the country?

**Karen DeYoung:** I don’t think she necessarily allied herself with them. Sometimes she did, but not always. I think that she was more seeing which way the wind was blowing, seeing the weight of how much effort Cheney was going to put into pushing a policy in one direction, and seeing her job as intuiting what Bush, on a gut level, wanted to do. You know, where somebody came up and said, democracy in the Middle East, that’ll be great, that sort of rang a bell with him.

On the Arab-Israeli thing, as you know, Powell felt very strongly that the United States had to be involved, that the United States had to be an honest broker, and yet he knew, certainly after 9/11, that Bush looked at the situation there and saw “Israel: democracy; Arab countries: not really democracies; Israel: terrorist attacks,” and said, that’s the side I’m on. And that certainly suited Cheney and a lot of the aides in the Defense Department, if not Rumsfeld; I don’t think Rumsfeld cared very much about the Arab-Israeli matter one way or the other. But Condi did not step in and say, wait a minute, Mr. President, we have a historical role there. She saw that Bush said, terrorists bad guys; Israel good guys, and said great, that’s what we’re going to do. Regardless of what she thought, and I think Powell felt that she was more balanced than others in the
administration, she was unwilling or unable to insert herself into the situation in the way that the National Security Advisor is supposed to.

**Question:** That’s exactly the question: did she do that because she was internally, at least, thinking of competing with the man who, as you described, looked at her as a daughter and not really as a colleague, was that what was driving the competition, or was she an ideologue?

**Karen DeYoung:** I guess what I’m saying is that I think it’s neither. I think that she was not strong enough; I think that most of her views, with few exceptions, at least at the beginning of the administration, probably would have coincided more with Powell’s than with, say, Paul Wolfowitz. Yet she, number one, was not capable of pushing that.

A good example was one of the first things that happened in the administration with the Kyoto treaty, where she called up Powell one day in March or April of ’01 and said, “We’ve gotten a letter from several Republican senators, saying, we don’t want the president to support the Kyoto treaty,” even though Bush had campaigned in 2000 saying he would have carbon emission caps and all that kind of stuff. He’d gotten this letter from a Republican senator and she said, “We’ve written an answer and you ought to look at it. And so he said, “Ok, send it over.” She sent it over to him, and he looked at it and he said, “I don’t particularly care what the policy is, but the fact is, you can’t send a response like this that doesn’t take into account our alliances. We’ve got a lot of allies, so we need to put in those obligatory paragraphs that say, ‘and of course we’ll consult with our allies.’”

So he sent back some wording and called her back a few minutes later and she said, “No, no, they don’t like that.” And he said, “Ok, I’m coming over there right now.” He went out, got in his car, went over to the White House, walked in, and she was sitting in the Oval Office with the president and they said, “Oh, sorry, too late. It’s gone.” Cheney, who had been pushing this, literally took the letter, got in his car, and rode up to Capitol Hill. Of course we all know what happened; the Europeans went crazy.

Where does she stand in all of that? She knew that the letter was wrong, she agreed with what Powell wanted to do with it, and yet she let it happen. I think that that happened over and over again because she wasn’t strong enough to say, “No, Mr. President, this is wrong, let’s not do it this way.”

**Question:** On the issue of how Powell dealt with the administration on Iraq, when he made his speech to the U.N., it seems clear that he had doubts, internal, and that he didn’t really feel prepared at the moment they asked him to do it. Was he trapped by the administration to do this? Did he feel he could make any counter-arguments that maybe this was not the right way to go, or did he feel in the end, as a soldier, he had to do what the Commander-in-Chief asked him to do? I wasn’t quite clear exactly what it was that got him to go to the U.N. and make that speech in defense of that policy.

**Question:** My understanding is that within the State Department he was getting advice that the intelligence was incorrect that he was being asked to present, and that the
intelligence research arm did have another view, so his statement that he was misled, how
do you... did he honestly go there thinking that it was the truth, what he was saying, or
did he just fall on a sword?

Karen DeYoung: Remember, starting in August of ’02, it was clear that the invasion was
being planned, even though they never, until the day of the invasion, sat down and said,
“What’s the downside of having a war?” It just was not part of the conversation. In
August of ’02, he went to the president and said, “Yes, we’re thinking of doing this war,
but you’ve got to go to the U.N.,” because in Powell’s mind, the template was the ’91 war:
U.N. mandate, lots of allies, military assistance from Arab countries and European
countries, lots of money, other people paid for it, and he did not see the urgency. He
didn’t doubt that the weapons of mass destruction were there, that Saddam Hussein had
violated twelve or sixteen or however many resolutions, whoever you want to believe. He
was very proud of the fact that Bush agreed with that. He went to the U.N., he did his
thing, and in November of ’02 they got their resolution and the inspectors went.

I think that Powell from then on saw himself as stuck in between the administration and
the Security Council, and was equally irritated with both of them. He felt that the French
in particular were pulling the rug out from underneath him in his negotiations with the
administration; that every time that de Villepin or Chirac stood up and said, “We will
never agree to an invasion, no matter what we find; it doesn’t matter if they kill all the
inspectors tomorrow, we will never agree,” that that limited his ability, which he still
thought was viable, to persuade the administration to at least take more time.

He was never opposed to the war. He never said, “We shouldn’t have this war.” He said,
“We need to take more time, there’s a reason to have a multinational force: not only
because it would be nice, but also because it will give us a better chance of success.” All
the things about the Pottery Barn and all that, all that’s true. You will end up with this
country from which you have taken the power structure away, and you’re going to have
twenty-five million Iraqis staring and you and saying, “Now what do we do?”

All that’s true, but I think in January of ’03, as the situation became more and more tense
at the Security Council and it became less and less likely that they were going to agree to
what the administration on the other side was pushing for in a much shorter time frame,
Powell really started to change his own rhetoric. He started to be much more vehement,
even in the way Cheney was, in saying, “The mobile labs are there, the aluminum tubes,
relations with al-Qaeda.”

If you look at his speech that he gave in late January in Davos at the World Economic
Forum, he really was completely over the top. He said virtually everything that he said
ten days later at the U.N. So he comes back from Davos, and he didn’t get a very good
reception in Davos, and he goes back to Washington, where they have been talking about
how they’re going to present this case, which was really something Tony Blair wanted
them to do. He said, “I’ve got to have a vote in Parliament, we’ve got to present the case,
we have all this great evidence.”
So Powell went back and they said, “We’re ready now to present this case,” which they already knew was coming, they’d all been talking about it. They said to Powell, “You’re the one to do it.” Number one, because they clearly thought people would believe him, and number two because their audience was much more public opinion in this country and in Parliament in Britain than in the Security Council, which they knew was not going to agree with them. And number three, because that’s what foreign ministers do. It’s foreign ministers who go to the Security Council and make the case.

They said, “Here, we’ve already got the speech ready for you.” They gave him this forty-eight page document which was to Powell’s mind- not necessarily in terms of substance but in terms of style, because he’s very proud of his speech-making abilities and his persuasive abilities- he looked at this and said, “This is a piece of crap.” He gave it to his Chief of Staff Larry Wilkerson, who got together a team and went out to the CIA and sat there with George Tenet and John McLaughlin and their aides and started going through the thing paragraph by paragraph and said, I want to see the proof of every allegation in here. They spent a whole day going through just the first few paragraphs and finally Tenet and Wilkerson said, “There’s no way that we’re going to get this finished in time.”

Powell, once he looked at it, had already called over to the White House and said, “I can’t do this in a week; give me some more time, I need at least a couple days.” And they said, sorry, because it was the day of the State of the Union where Bush was going to announce this presentation. They’d already briefed the press on it and said, “Oh, it’s going to be February 5th,” so the time frame was very short.

At the end of that process, I think that they felt that they’d done a huge amount of work, that they’d thrown out all this sort of outrageous rhetoric that the White House had put in it. The problem was, what was left was compiled on the basis of one question, which was, “What is the best evidence that will prove that weapons of mass destruction are there?” Nobody said, “Gee, do you have any evidence that says maybe they’re not there?” It was not a zero base exercise. So at the end of that week all the State Department people were feeling very proud of themselves and said, “Wow, we sure dodged a bullet there, we took all this crap out of the speech.” The mindset was such that it didn’t occur to them that what was left was also crap.

I don’t think Powell thought that he was being asked to give false information. It is true that the INR at the State Department had on some very specific things; on the aluminum tubes they had a different opinion, and as a result of that Powell re-wrote one paragraph that said, “Everybody doesn’t agree; however The thing about the uranium purchases in Niger, nobody even suggested putting that in the speech, on either side, because they all knew it was garbage. And so that just sort of never came up. INR did make some specific suggestions, but not to the basic principle. Not to the fact that the weapons were there, that the mobile labs were there. They objected a little bit to the ties with al-Qaeda.

The problem was that as we now know, from the Senate Intelligence Committee inquiries and other investigations, that not only was a lot of that information false but that there were at least some people in the intelligence community who knew it was false at the
time. George Tenet and John McLaughlin maintain to this day that no one told them about that, and therefore they could not have told Powell about it. It seems pretty inconceivable to a lot of people.

**Question:** I was curious about the fact that General Powell has been so reluctant to criticize the administration, yet he obviously knew this book was going to come out around the election time. But he’s also seeing so many of his former colleagues, generals who retired from the military, really criticize the foreign policy and also military policy. Is he going to regret one day that he has not been as public in his criticism of the way the war is going, et cetera, especially if he has future political aspirations?

**Question:** I’m Jennifer Sloan from the Canadian Consulate, and former Director of Communications for the Canadian Foreign Minister who was Colin Powell’s counterpart, John Manley. Two very vivid personal memories of Colin Powell: one, in the G8 Foreign Ministers in Rome in the summer of 2001, Minister Manley, Colin Powell, Richard Boucher and myself with champagne overlooking Rome, and these two men talking about the insaneness of their time sitting around a table about commas and periods and full stops on a communiqué that had been negotiated for months with officials. And then second, Minister Manley shuffled by the Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister’s office and within ten minutes of us getting in the car from the swearing-in ceremony to the airport, Colin Powell’s on the phone from his plane saying how sorry he’s leaving and how much they’ve enjoyed their time together. And I guess my question’s perhaps simplistic, maybe more complicated, but is the fact that Colin Powell was never a good politician or would never have been a good politician simply because he has no political gut check, just ultimately too nice a guy? Which was kind of the situation with my guy. I just wonder.

**Question:** I’m curious as to what prompted you to want to write this book and how you went about getting his permission and his cooperation in all of this. Was it difficult; was it easy? And also, since Bob Woodward’s book, *State of Denial*, I just finished that last week, if you have read it, I’m just wondering if you agree with the characterization of Colin Powell in that book. You’ve obviously dealt much more deeply with General Powell.

**Question:** What I wanted to ask is, whether, if he had run for president and had won, would he have made a good president?

**Karen DeYoung:** His reluctance to criticize I think stems from several things. This is a guy who is a person of institutions; he is a very formal person in a lot of ways. He, I think, thinks it is unseemly to criticize the administration in office when he was part of it, to criticize decisions that were made when he was part of it, which he went along with, clearly, at the time, regardless of how he felt about them. There’s something kind of sleazy, I think he thinks, of criticizing afterwards. He does not like it when the generals criticize, although I mention in the book that he was quite pleased with Tony Zinni, during the build-up to the war, he was quite pleased for Tony Zinni to go out there, and he had a cut out through Armitage, who was Zinni’s friend, to go out and say that.
He will criticize things that he criticized when he was in the administration and that’s things like the prisoner and detainee policy, which he did criticize very strongly and it was one of the things where he repeatedly did what he hardly ever did, which was to demand a meeting with the president and go in and say, “This is wrong, to not respect the Geneva Conventions, there’s no reason to do it, it will harm you in these ways.” In his mind, that’s a legitimate subject for criticism because that was something that he criticized at the time.

Is he going to regret it? I don’t think so. I think he’s emerged remarkably unscathed from all this, and while I know there are people who say Colin Powell should bear a heavy, heavy burden for persuading people that this war was the right thing to do, he doesn’t see it that way.

I don’t think he will run for president. That will never happen. And that’s to go to the question of politics. I think he would have made a good president, and I think that he is a good politician in the sense that in previous administrations, even in the Clinton administration when he was Chairman, certainly in the elder Bush administration, he was a very good politician. He formed alliances, he knows how popular he is, he’s a very careful steward of his own reputation and that’s why the whole Iraq thing was such an anomaly, I think, for him. He always had allies in Congress; Republicans and Democrats. He had allies in the cabinet.

The problem in this administration is that there were no allies, there was no Sam Nunn who had power that he could go to behind the back of the administration, there was no Jim Baker, another member of the cabinet who basically agreed with him. He was it, and there was nobody for him to negotiate with. I think he’s not a Mr. Nice Guy. I mean, he’s a very nice man, and he’s lots of fun to talk to and he’s very smart and all of that, but he is very calculating in a lot of ways. He’s very calculating, again, except for the enormous mistakes that he made in the Bush administration; very calculating about his own reputation.

How did I get access? Right after 9/11, I was asked to go work in the White House. We had two political reporters working in the White House who were very good reporters. Remember, the assumption was that there wouldn’t be foreign policy in the Bush administration. But 9/11 happened and it was clear that this was going to be a big deal and so I was asked to essentially cover the National Security Council, which is not possible, for anyone who’s dealt with this administration. There’s no give and take there at all, and so you have to go in circles around them; you have to talk to the State Department, the Pentagon, the Diplomatic Corps, you have to figure out what’s going on before you approach them. I spent a lot of time at the State Department. I didn’t actually cover the State Department; there were other reporters who were covering Powell, but I paid a lot of attention to what he was saying and I went on a couple trips with him.

In covering the White House in the lead-up to the war, it really was more than a full-time job. I was really burned out; I couldn’t even remember what I’d written the day before, let alone a week ago, I was just kind of churning it out and churning it out and churning it
out, and I was trying to find a way out of that, something that would maintain my interest and also allow me to have an income, which I needed. And so I settled on this, and I didn’t ask Powell. I didn’t talk to him about it. I went and got a book contract and it was an easy book to sell, and as I arranged for leave at the paper and started to think about how I was going to organize it. The Carnegie Endowment was nice enough to give me a place to work, and I finally wrote a letter to Powell and said, “Look, I’m writing this book and I would like to talk to you at some point.”

Eventually I went to his office to talk to him and he agreed that he would give me I think four interviews. I said I only wanted to talk to him about what happened since his own book came out, because I felt there were lots of sources of information and my time with him was limited. One of the things I realized about him, as I said before, is that his reputation, his public persona, is extremely important to him, and he manages it. One of the funny things in the book when I talk about 1995 after he said he wasn’t going to run for president, he was still enormously popular, and through ’96 he got invitations from all over, Republicans, Democrats, saying, “Please come to my district and speak.” Strom Thurmond said come to my district. Newt Gingrich said come to my district. Cleland said please come to my district because the Republican who’s running against me is a scumbag and I know that you agree with me so please come to my district.

He turned them all down, because that wasn’t the Colin Powell that he thought he should be. And so I think talking to me was a way of shaping my version of who he was and he wasn’t about to let me shape it myself without input from him. It’s not an authorized biography; he didn’t know who else I was talking to. He basically did two things: he let me interview him, and we ultimately did six interviews, and he gave me access to his papers. He didn’t read anything before it was published. I didn’t consult with him on anything. I think it was a way for him to get his views on record without having to say it himself and without having to deal with the immediacy of newspaper journalism.

**Question:** Have you heard from him since it’s been published?

**Karen DeYoung:** I’ve talked to him several times on stories and stuff but he has not mentioned the book at all. I actually got an email from Joe Persico, who was the guy who wrote his autobiography, basically, consulted with him, and he said, great book, he was telling me he liked the book, and then he said, “I’ve talked to Colin. He seems content, even without the wings and the halos that most biographic subjects demand.” So, I don’t know. Other people have told me that he thinks it’s fair.

**Pat Ellis:** This is a great place to end this absolutely wonderful program, and thank you so much Karen. Make sure that you all get a copy of the book because Karen has graciously agreed to stay and sign them.