Beyond the Headlines
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Husain Haqqani
Ambassador of Pakistan to the US

Karen DeYoung
Associate Editor, The Washington Post

A Conversation on US-Pakistani Relations

Patricia Ellis: Good evening everyone and welcome. I’m Patricia Ellis, President of the Women’s Foreign Policy Group. We promote women’s leadership and women’s voices on pressing international issues of the day, such as our topic for tonight, US-Pakistan relations. On behalf of the WFPG and our board members who are present tonight—Dawn Calabia, Gail Kitch, Donna Constantinople and Theresa Loar—I want to welcome everybody here. We’re so glad that you could join us for this [Beyond] the Headlines event—these are events on hot issues in the news. And recently we’ve done events on Egypt, Libya, women in the Middle East, and our event tonight is with Ambassador Husain Haqqani, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, who will be joined by our friend and frequent speaker and moderator, Washington Post senior national security correspondent Karen DeYoung, for a conversation on US-Pakistan relations. The event could not be more timely, as we all know, given the increased tensions in the relationship between the two countries following the killing of Osama Bin Laden. We’re so pleased to have the Ambassador with us tonight to explore the complexities and the importance of this relationship, and extremely lucky to have Karen back.

I want to recognize a few guests who are here with us tonight: Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Judith McHale [Applause], Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, Deborah McCarthy [Applause], members of our Corporate Advisory Council, and of course our many ambassadors and diplomatic colleagues, who we work very closely with throughout the years on our embassy events. Our next one is going to be in July, at the Embassy of Zambia, and it will be on African women leaders promoting investment, trade and peace. We are hoping that many of you will be able to join us for this very special event.

It now gives me great pleasure to welcome our speaker and moderator. You have their bios in your program book, so I am just going to give you the highlights and a few of their accomplishments. Ambassador Haqqani has represented Pakistan in the United States since 2008, and he appears regularly on television and frequently publishes op-ed pieces. He was an adviser to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and is a journalist, author, professor, and scholar. Our moderator Karen DeYoung, associate editor and senior national security correspondent for The Post, is also an author and has served in many senior positions at The Post in Washington and abroad, and has covered Pakistan and Afghanistan extensively. So we’re really lucky to have both of them tonight. After the Ambassador’s opening remarks, he and Karen will have a conversation before opening it up to Q&A with the audience. So please join me in welcoming Ambassador Haqqani and Karen DeYoung. [Applause.]

Ambassador Husain Haqqani: Thank you very much, Patricia, for that kind introduction. Of course, when I was asked to come here, I thought, “Nobody’s paying any attention to Pakistan these days. [Laughter.] Nothing gets said about Pakistan in the media, so why not use this forum to be able to communicate and of course find an excuse to be on C-SPAN?” [Laughter.] And so therefore, here I am.
It's a pleasure to see [Under] Secretary McHale in the audience. Judith McHale and I have worked together since her appointment as Under Secretary, and public diplomacy, of course, is one of the many challenges that we have dealt with at our end. So it's a pleasure seeing you here, and thank you for all the help and cooperation that you offered here. And also there's a distinguished audience, many of whom I know personally for quite some time, which just tells you how old I am.

But I would like to also recognize my very able Deputy, Iffat Gardezi. The Embassy of Pakistan is very lucky to have a woman as the second in command. We have had two women ambassadors, which is probably a better score than most countries who send representatives abroad. And so I'm very proud to have a very competent woman as my right hand at the Embassy.

Let me just begin by saying that the United States and Pakistan have been allies for a long time. Pakistan and the United States actually signed a mutual defense agreement in 1959. We started an aid relationship going back to 1949. Considering that Pakistan got its independence in 1947, that's like, really, since inception. And then we have had a treaty relationship since 1954 when Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which is part of John Foster Dulles's ring of treaties for containment of Communism. So Pakistan and the US have been allies for a long time, but sometimes I feel that this is like a couple that has been married for a very long time but still doesn't know each other. [Laughter.] And that is why we have periodic difficulties and differences.

Pakistan, culturally, is a society which values relationships and consistency in relationships. The United States has a relatively more functional approach, especially in international relations. And that has been the real sore point here between the two. The Americans always come and say, “Let's do this together.” And the Pakistanis think, “Ah, this is the beginning of a relationship.” And when that is done, the Americans say, “Fine, now we've got other things to do.” And the Pakistanis feel this is very disturbing, this is a disturbing trend; the Americans are not really our friends. Then a few years later, something else comes up, and the Americans say, “Well, you know, now we need to do this together.” So the most important thing is to understand that if there is to be an American-Pakistani partnership, it has to be a long-term strategic partnership. And it cannot just be transactional. There will always be transactions. There are transactions even in the closest of relationships. I'm a father, and so I know. You have transactions even with your kids. [Laughter.] There is nothing wrong with transactional, but it can't be exclusively transactional.

And to understand the context of why Pakistan is—you know, newspapers sometimes describe Pakistanis as quote-on-quote “paranoid” and “India-centric,” etc. No, we have a region where we will live long after the American’s security concern du jour has passed. We know that from fact. We know it from the Cold War. We were the country that provided the intelligence base from which Francis Gary Powers took off for his mission over the Soviet Union and got shot down, only to have the Soviet Union threaten us with retaliation because he took off from a base in Pakistan—without there being any American commitment actually to be there to protect us against that retaliation if that occurred. Those are pieces of history.

Now Americans are a great nation. And I’ve said this so many times. Those of you who have heard me speak everywhere, you know that this is my little cliché, but I'm going to repeat it anyway, because sometimes clichés are good. And that is that Americans do a lot of things very well. America is a great nation which has contributed immensely to human progress, the idea of liberty, the idea of freedom, the idea of democracy, modern capitalism, globalization, everything. And then of course, more inventions than any other nation in at least the last 200 years.

All of that is great, but there’s one thing Americans don’t do—in fact two things Americans don’t do well. One is history. The American attitude to history is, “You know, Joe? He’s history!” [Laughter. Applause.] Or, as Henry Ford said once, “All history is bunk.” That’s the attitude: it’s for kids who go to college and study. There was somebody, a young man, who introduced himself as a history major. And I looked at
him and I said when I was teaching in this country, the problem for the history department was always finding enough kids who wanted a history major, because everybody wonders what kind of job am I going to get with a history major. Not understanding history. And the second part that Americans don’t do well is patience. [Laughter.]

And we, in our part of the world, for us history is most important. There’s a historic context both to our relationship and to our relationship with our neighbors. And because of that, we find ourselves in a position where we have never been fully able to—or at least some parts of our government—have never been fully able to trust their counterparts in the US government and vice versa. And now we have a situation in which we have a war that we need to fight and win for our people’s sake, which is the war against terrorists and terrorism. Terrorists have killed more Pakistanis in the last several years than they have killed any citizens of any other single nation. 30,000 people have died in Pakistan because of terrorist actions. And that includes Benazir Bhutto, our most popular leader, the spouse of our current president, and a very dear personal friend of many of us in government, including myself, and a respected leader for us. And we are the only country that has actually lost military officers of the rank of general in this effort.

That said, we do have a complicated reality in our region. And therefore, that complicated reality sometimes does not always intersect positively with American policy aims in our region and causes problems. So the Americans want it done yesterday, Pakistanis say, “Let’s do it quietly and patiently,” Americans do it their way, Pakistanis do not agree with the way the Americans want to do it, and the headline is: “Pakistan-US relationship on the brink of breakdown again.” Let me just say that this relationship is under stress but it is not on the brink, because both sides also realize the value of each other to each other. The Pakistanis realize how important the US is to Pakistan, and the US recognizes and realizes how important Pakistan is to the US.

If there is to be a stable Afghanistan, that stable Afghanistan requires Pakistan’s critical participation in any reconciliation process in Afghanistan. At the same time, the defeat of Al-Qaeda and all terrorist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda also requires Pakistan to be able to defeat them at home, for our own sake. We don’t need to do it just for you; we need to do it for ourselves. But it’s not easy. It’s not easy simply because these people have support networks. As has been said by many American officials, Osama bin Laden was found in Pakistan. There’s no evidence that anybody in the Pakistani government had anything to do with his presence there. But obviously he had some people in Pakistan who supported him. And here’s my answer to that query. 118 million people in Pakistan, the country overwhelmingly Muslim. A lot of them share views and ideologies and belief systems that make them sympathetic to radical groups, and that is where the effort of trying to change the whole discourse of Pakistan, changing the whole milieu, the environment, the economy, the educational system has been very important.

And that cannot be done in a transactional manner. You can’t say “We’ll give you two billion dollars, change everybody’s mind and make them all stop thinking that the restoration of an Islamic caliphate is the best course for Muslims of the world today.” And so with those kinds of numbers, if 1% of the population is sympathetic to a radical view for Islamic revival and resurgence, we’re talking about 1.8 million people. That’s a lot of people. It’s not a small number, and amongst them can there be people who can actually create networks and they can work and actually provide a private safe haven, a private sanctuary very cleverly designed and very cleverly protected for somebody like Osama bin Laden? Absolutely they can. So what is important is to get over the moment.

The good news here is that every few day, when I have spare time, which is like three minutes a day, I actually try to find some old—and I play this game with Karen also, who’s one of the recipients of those emails of mine. What I do is I email to journalists stories that have appeared about the US-Pakistan relationship or something from like seven years ago. And I kind of say, oh by the way, today’s headline, headline seven years ago, “Ground Hog Day”—the movie, not the...[Laughter.] It’s that kind of quality; there are certain things that keep repeating.
We have to go past this simplification that Pakistanis simply cannot be trusted by the United States, and that the United States is fickle when it comes to its relationship with Pakistan. It’s a difficult narrative to manage, and as I said earlier, it’s an easy job—that’s why I have it. [Laughter.] But we are working on it. It’s not going to be easy; it’s not going to happen overnight. Patience is required. The important thing is that the two countries need each other, and we will continue to work at it, past the headline du jour, past the crisis du jour, and past the strategic momentary thinking du jour. We have to go beyond that and understand Pakistan is the only Muslim majority nation with nuclear weapons; strategically located at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East; has neighbors such as India and Iran and China and Afghanistan; and, therefore, its strategic location cannot be wished away—or can the complexities of its populace, 180 million people. There is no such thing as a Pakistani monolith. 180 million people living in a new democracy will have a lot of diversity.

The good news, again, is we are working on our democracy. We’ve sustained it for three years; hopefully, we will be able to sustain it for the longer-term future. As a democracy, it will be easier for the United States to work together with Pakistan. We’re in the process of normalizing relations with the two neighbors that we have had difficult relations with, Afghanistan and India, in the past. And you see that that is already happening. And the third thing is that we’re also thinking and looking at things differently. Instead of sitting at the crossroad of the conflict of these three regions, we want to see ourselves as sitting at the opportunities that these three regions present ourselves.

Transformation and transition is never easy. It’s going to be difficult. It’s going to take time, but we have the clarity of our vision, and the intent is there to do it.

I’m going to leave all the tough questions for Karen to ask and for me to answer during the dialogue. Thank you all for being here. [Applause.]

Ms. DeYoung: Well, you can all see Ambassador Haqqani is a very adept speaker. [Laughter.] And he’s had lots of opportunities in all kinds of forums. He’s paired with John Stewart on The Daily Show, he’s done Charlie Rose, he’s done innumerable talk shows, and he’s incredibly adept at not answering questions that I want him to answer. [Laughter.] So I’m going to try. I’m going to try.

Ambassador Haqqani: I was waiting for a compliment, Karen! [Laughter.]

Ms. DeYoung: That was a compliment! [Laughter.] That was a compliment. In the beginning of your remarks, you talked about public diplomacy and what a challenge it was for both our countries. You were quoted recently as talking about remarks you made at Pakistan’s National Defense University, where you asked your audience who Pakistan’s enemy was. You asked them how many of them thought that Al-Qaeda was the enemy and not too many raised their hands, you asked them whether India was the enemy and not too many raised their hands, you asked them whether India was the enemy and not too many raised their hands, a few more, and then you asked them whether the United States was the enemy, and that’s where you got most of the hands raised.

I think that is something that people in this country just find inexplicable—just can’t understand. They say, “My gosh, we’ve given Pakistan 20 billion dollars over the past eight or nine years,” and granted, that’s kind of a pittance, compared to what has gone into Afghanistan and some other places, but it’s certainly more than in the past. So can you just explain to us, why is it that Pakistanis don’t like this country?

Ambassador Haqqani: First of all, let me begin by correcting the narrative on what happened at the National Defense University in Islamabad. It was, of course, Chatham House Rules. Eventually the National Defense University put a video on their website, NDU Islamabad, and you can see, actually, those who thought—and this was a mixed audience of civilians and military, so it wasn’t just the military officers there, we should be very clear about that—but, those who thought that Al-Qaeda was the major
threat, and those who thought the United States was a major threat were more or less equal in number. There were less people concerned about India. So that’s the correct factual position.

It was just after the Abbottabad incident, in which Osama bin Laden was taken out, and the feeling in Pakistan was that the US had violated Pakistan’s sovereignty in doing that, that the US could have done the same with Pakistan’s cooperation. And so that was the divide within Pakistan that was reflected in that. It’s not just a very—a simplistic analysis of it would be—it’s more nuanced. Even those people who didn’t mind Osama bin Laden being taken out, they thought the US shouldn’t have done it unilaterally, they should have, it’s like, “I have a problem in my backyard, well you can ring the front doorbell and ask me to help you to clean it up, or you can jump across the wall and come and do it”—there will be two different reactions to those two different things.

As far as, why is the United States not popular in Pakistan, or not liked? Let me just say that Pakistan is not very well liked in the United States either right now. And that always has to do with how perceptions are being managed or are being stated. If the news daily is that Pakistan is the source of trouble for American forces in Afghanistan, without the detail of what the context is, if it is said that, “the US asked Pakistan to do X, Y, Z, and Pakistan refused,” etc., the ordinary guy in Mobile, Alabama, is not really as much an expert on foreign policy. Although there are those who would argue that there aren’t that many real experts on foreign policy inside the beltway either [Laughter.], but the poor guy in Mobile, Alabama, is just listening to the news, he’s catching that 30-second sound bite on radio as he’s driving home from his job, and he hears something negative about Pakistan—that’s how is perception is being created.

In Pakistan, the reverse is happening. And the US made a huge mistake several years ago, when you shut down your United States Information Agency, which was a huge public diplomacy operation, which basically was about explaining America to people. Now your attitude is, “We give you money, now you should like us.” Well, with all due respect, how many of you have actually fallen for that one in your private lives? Ex-spouses collect alimony and they still don’t like the former husband. [Laughter.] It’s not the way the world works.

So I can’t understand why people can’t understand that here’s a country where the general feeling is that the Americans came and asked us to help them create a massive military operation against the Soviet Union when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. It was called the major operation to stop Soviet march toward the South, towards Iran, towards Pakistan and towards the [Inaudible]. We helped. We created this huge, humongous operation of Jihadi groups and organizations. Now the golden rule is: you arm people, you disarm them at the end of the battle. It’s always happened. When you have conscription, you take the guns back from the conscripts; you give them some other thing to do. But instead of doing that, you did exactly—I mean anybody who’s watched Charlie Wilson’s War has seen the caricature version of that, I was there for the more complex version of it. I remember when I was here in this town as a relatively younger man, begging American congressmen and senators not to shut down the International Military Education and Training Program for Pakistan. At least keep that, so that you will have Pakistani military officers who have exposure to the United States. And they said they couldn’t be bothered, because the main concern, which was the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, was over. And so the US just walked away.

Pakistan has had to deal with the fallout. Now, of course, it wasn’t managed very well—we concede that. There were leaders in Pakistan, General Zia-Ul-Haq, some of his military successors, and many political leaders who didn’t understand the complexity of it all, and, basically, they just thought, “Well all we need to do is just divert these guys from Afghanistan to other fronts, and try and use them as instruments of influence. But the real problem lay in the fact that all of a sudden from having economic resources to train them, to equip them, and having equipped them, there was nothing for them. And so all these guys turned on us. And so we’ve had a problem since then. So that’s one of the reasons why people dislike the United States—the United States is fickle, walks away, doesn’t care about what the outcome is for us.
The second reason is: there is an overall negativity toward the United States all over the Muslim world—you have had a problem in telling your story throughout the Muslim world. It’s amazing, if you watch Al Jazeera Arabic, I don’t know how many people here do, but if you watch Al Jazeera Arabic, you know what? It’s sometimes even more sympathetic to Israel, because the Israelis have an Arabic-speaking spokesperson on Al Jazeera all the time. Since they have done that, they are able to tell their own story in their own words. Well, there is no Arabic-speaking American spokesperson that goes on Al Jazeera so the Arabs don’t get to hear the Arab version. Ditto for Pakistan. And then you have these people in our media—we freed our media all of a sudden, and now we have something like 38 24/7 news channels in different languages in Pakistan—guess what the United States would be like with 38 Fox News channels or MSNBCs. [Laughter.] Well, that’s the reality you are dealing with there, except you didn’t invest in it, so none of the channels are really on your side. And that is the reason why people don’t like the United States in Pakistan: you haven’t told your story, you’ve walked away from Pakistan, and, by and large, there is this whole fallout of the perception management.

Now, Secretary Clinton went there, did some town hall meetings, guess what? The graph went up. Now, I mean I won’t overplay this—from 11% approval rating, it went up to 21%, maybe 10% gain, but hey, a few town hall meetings, trying to explain your position to people, you get a 10% bump? If it was an election year in the United States and this was happening in Iowa, you’d all make headlines out of it. You have to keep it sustained, and this is another problem you have. Because you’ve painted Pakistan as a hardship posting, most American diplomats—and it’s not a family posting—so most American diplomats go there for one-year postings. Three months of unpacking, six months of service, three months of packing again—that’s no way to actually have interaction with the population. So your case is going unheard. I mean, sometimes I make a better case, if I may say so, for US-Pakistan relations on Pakistani television than your entire government, and I am not paid half as well as most of the people in the US government. [Laughter.]

Ms. DeYoung: I think—

Ambassador Haqqani: And I did answer that question in tremendous detail. [Laughter.]

Ms. DeYoung: You did, you did. I think that one of the concerns, however, is that, if, as you say, the Pakistani government realizes it needs the United States, just as the United States realizes it needs Pakistan, that the belief here is that it’s incumbent on Pakistani leaders, sometimes, to defend this relationship, and that they don’t see that happening. That it’s not just up to the United States to say, “Hey, like us,” but that Pakistani leaders—particularly in the military—sometimes overtly act against a better relationship, and that many of the stories that are in the Pakistani media, which you so rightly recognize, are quite anti-American. That your own military sees it to its advantage and to its own benefit to portray this relationship as not good.

Ambassador Haqqani: Karen, the important thing is that—I mean, leaks in the media is an instrument that is used often by people who are losing the policy argument. Let’s be honest. I mean, that’s one way to sabotage the momentum. So if you had that situation in Pakistan, it’s obviously those individuals within the government apparatus, whether civilians or non-civilians, who feel that the elected leadership is moving the country in a totally different direction from where they would ideologically want it. But the way to fight it would be together.

So while I concede the point that there may be too much misinformation in circulation in Pakistan on US-Pakistan relations, and you and I both know the details of what, sometimes, these stories are, you know? Conspiracy theories are a very common thing in our part of the world. It’s unfortunate, but look, let’s be real—first of all, we have a very young population, half of our population is below the age of 18. 48% of those below-18 kids don’t go to school. So it’s very easy for someone to go onto television and tell some unusual story that sounds very plausible to them, you know, for example, we had a recent television show in which this guy was talking about some alleged satellite-based system that America has, and they have a fancy name for it, it’s called HAARP [High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program], I don’t know
what the heck that stands for. But allegedly the US has the ability, from satellites, to maneuver and manipulate, and cause floods and cause earthquakes. I mean it’s absolute nonsense, with all due respect to whoever used it on television, although I don’t have much respect for them. But they say it, they get away with it.

And so I agree with you, that there is that, those elements who may be leaking stuff to the media for policy reasons, but if the US and Pakistan worked together on this, if the governments are clearly understanding of the thing, and they say, you know, we have to work together and we have to stick it out, we will be able to work on that. It’s happened in other countries, Pakistan is not the first country that has been affected and influenced by conspiracy theories in a significant way. There are other countries where this happens. Southeast Asia—I was there as a young journalist way back in the early eighties, and the situation was not very different. There were a lot of conspiracy theories in circulation, Americans made a serious effort, got the governments on board, worked it out. It can be done.

I was just answering why it hasn’t happened, and my answer is, it hasn’t happened because it hasn’t received the kind of quality attention that it should have, and the consistent attention. After 9/11, the US did a quick shotgun marriage with the unelected regime of General Musharraf. Neither the government of Pakistan, nor the American leadership at that time considered it necessary to try and create any public support for changing the environment, for a greater American presence, etc. And then, things like, for example, the Ray Davis incident, where this gentleman decided to play Jason Bourne in real life, and killed two people in broad daylight in a Pakistani city, didn’t help. I mean, [it’s] the argument about do you expect the illiterate population in our villages and in our small towns to understand arguments about diplomatic immunity? The way they saw it, it was an ugly American who shot two Pakistanis without any provocation or reason. And then getting away with it. And so those are the things that also have to be taken into account—it’s not just always our fault. There’s enough blame to go around.

Ms. DeYoung: I am going to give you a compliment now, which is that I think that the best ambassadors in Washington recognize the amount of attention that they actually have to devote to Congress. You have to know a lot of people, you have to spend a lot of time with them, sometimes even more time than you spend with people in the Administration. And I think that that’s one of the things that you have done, and one of the things you spend the most time on. What’s your sense of what the feeling is in Congress now? Are you worried that there is going to be a real push to cut off, to circumscribe this relationship? Obviously the Obama Administration has gone out of its way, I think it’s fair to say, and John Brennan did it again today in a speech of saying, “Look, yes, this is a complicated relationship, we need each other, we’re going to try really hard, this is going to work,” and listing all of Pakistan’s accomplishments in counterterrorism. How concerned are you, and what effect would it actually have if Congress stands up and starts complaining more, actually to the point of imposing more restrictions on aid and threatening to cut it off?

Ambassador Haqqani: First of all, we don’t want this relationship to be just about aid, so I think that when people start talking about threatening to cut off aid, etc., etc., I tell them, you know what, let’s just back off on this aid business. It’s not like we are hired help, and the aid is our remuneration. It’s something that we have worked together [on], we have both agreed that that’s the way forward, to try and strengthen our countries’ capabilities in fighting terrorism, and having the social and the economic base that will enable us to deny the terrorist recruiters more recruits for the future. So let’s not just make it as aid is reward, and then when there is some behavior that is unacceptable, aid is withdrawn. Let’s not talk like that.

But that said, I’m concerned, and I fully understand, by the way, the concerns of Congress also. I fully understand, because they have to explain, to a very complicated American audience, which does not always understand the nuance of foreign policy—Middle America’s concerns are jobs, Middle America’s concerns are the American economy, and in a situation like this, 1 billion dollars, 2 billion dollars, without realizing, by the way, that, maybe, the war in Afghanistan is consuming 12 billion dollars a month, which is six times the annual assistance that is being spoken of in relation to Pakistan—that
doesn’t always register. It’s not rational, it’s just emotional. And the emotional thing is, if Osama bin Laden was in Pakistan, well, let’s cut off assistance to Pakistan because that’s the only—when you have a hammer, every problem is a nail. So you’re in Congress, you’ve got the hammer of aid, and that’s what you use.

The truth is it hasn’t worked in the past. Cutting off aid. The aid, we would like it for the sake of being able to have that relationship. But cutting off aid as a weapon of influencing policy hasn’t usually worked. That said, Congress will, I’m quite sure, listen to your military leaders, listen to the Administration. Because after all, as a student of the United States” history, and as someone who admires America’s founding principles, I do understand that there was a reason why the founding fathers and the authors of the American Constitution led the conduct of foreign policy to be the jurisdiction essentially of the Executive Branch. Because while the money has to be appropriated by Congress, the actual conduct of foreign policy has to be done by the Executive Branch. Because they understand, they have people who understand in detail, whereas elected officials and members of Congress who make a lot of effort now in this day and age to go and try and understand their countries, their primary responsibility is essentially to their constituents.

And so we are in an ongoing dialogue with members of Congress, many of whom have been very supportive. There are some who are asking tough questions, and I respect them for asking those tough questions. My wife is a Member of Parliament in Pakistan, and, at hearings in Pakistan, she asks tough questions because that’s what her voters voted her into office for. So I would like the Congress to continue to ask tough questions, both of your administration and I’m here on behalf of Pakistan to answer their tough questions. But I think that this is not something that is going to be worked out by taking those tough questions a step farther and making them into threats—that is not what we should be doing. And I think the American Administration’s position is the position that will bring Pakistan and the United States into an equilibrium in which American goals and Pakistan’s positive goals will both be fulfilled. Only together, not by going at each other.

Ms. DeYoung: I want to switch subjects a little bit to Afghanistan. This week, you had the latest meeting of the core group of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States to talk about reconciliation issues in Afghanistan. Can you talk a little bit about what Pakistan’s assessment is of that process now? Not only the core group process, but reconciliation in general, reports of United States meetings with Taliban officials, and also what Pakistan can bring to the table? Pakistan has talked frequently about needing to have a seat at the table, what do you bring to the table? The Americans have said you need to either sever your relationship, for example, with the Haqqani network, or bring them into this process. What can Pakistan do in order to make this process work better?

Ambassador Haqqani: First of all, we support a reconciliation in Afghanistan because we understand that wars essentially always end through some kind of reconciliation and talks anyway. So the reconciliation process in Afghanistan has to be led by the Afghans. It’s their country and to bring to an end the internal conflict in Afghanistan that started after the departure of the Soviets, way back, [in] ’89, the Soviets went, their clients in Kabul continued to hold on, had a tenuous hold until 1992. And after 1992, there was the famous civil war, which then brought the Taliban to power. So we do not want in any way to intervene in the internal Afghan process. It has to be an Afghan-led process, we are very closely in contact with the Afghan leadership, President Karzai has visited Pakistan recently, our leaders have continuously engaged with the leadership in Kabul and Afghanistan. And the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan form the core group in which we will then slowly engage others.

Why is Afghanistan being so difficult? One minute for me to play Professor Haqqani instead of Ambassador Haqqani. History. When the Soviets left, a lot of regional powers all ended up adopting the different factions of the armed groups in Afghanistan that had been created primarily to fight the Soviet Union. The Americans went, created a vacuum, but some groups were adopted by Iran, some by the Russians and subsequently the Central Asian states, some by our eastern neighbor India, and some by Pakistan. So you ended up having different groups having links with different regional actors and
regional powers. And so, any reconciliation in Afghanistan has to be based on the concept that none of the regional powers will play a role in Afghanistan in terms of trying to dictate the outcome of the reconciliation.

What can Pakistan do? Pakistan is willing to facilitate in every way. We still have 2.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The Afghans in Pakistan, as you know, we have the ethnic overlap—there are Pashtuns in Afghanistan, there are Pashtuns in Pakistan. We want the Pakistani Pashtuns, who have tribal and ethnic links with their counterparts, to understand that the Pakistani Pashtuns will continue to look towards Islamabad, the Afghani Pashtuns should look towards Kabul, but our Pashtun elements can, and our intelligence services' links with various people within the Pashtuns on both sides of the border, can be used to facilitate the reconciliation and peacemaking process in Afghanistan.

The US has to make up its mind on what it wants to see as the endgame in Afghanistan. And once it has made up its mind, encourage the Afghan government to continue to take the lead role. We are there as facilitators. [The] most important thing is that all three—Afghans, Pakistanis and Americans—have to share all information, be trusting of each other, and nobody should try to do something that creates new misgivings on the part of the others. If we are partners, we have to be full partners.

And I think that a lot more is happening here, Karen, and that doesn't mean you’re going to write a story about that soon, but there’s a lot more happening quietly and behind the scenes—as it should. As it should. In all such processes, the quiet diplomacy that sets the stage for the events that will be seen by the world as the beginning of the reconciliation process—I think those events are quietly taking place right now. I won’t say that they’re going to succeed tomorrow or the day after, but in all such things, once the breakthrough comes, then the reconciliation moves much faster. Right now we are in the preliminary stages. Hopefully we will move faster, as and when we are all clear on agreed goals and start trusting each other a little more.

Ms. DeYoung: I'm going to open the floor to questions now. And if you could—do we have a microphone that we’re going to bring around? Is someone going to bring it around, or do we want people to go to the back? I'll call on you, if you could say who you are, and we'll let Pat, who's got her hand up there, ask the first question.

Ms. Ellis: I’m Patricia Ellis, Women's Foreign Policy Group. You said we have to get over the moment. I’m wondering if you could give us any—two questions—concrete steps that could be taken to improve the relationship. You talked about the value of more visits by senior officials, more consultation. What are some other things that could be done? And another issue in Washington relates to one of your neighbors—that is, China. And there seems to be some concern in conversations that Pakistan is getting closer to its friend China, and particularly in the nuclear arena, and I’m wondering if you could address that concern.

Ambassador Haqqani: I’ll answer the second question first and then come to the first one. China and Pakistan have been close since 1949. When the Communists took over Beijing, it was our understanding that since they’re our neighbors in the north, we could not afford not to recognize the People’s Republic. Furthermore, our position was, we didn’t think that the Republic of China, sitting in Taiwan at that time, would actually be able to go back and take over the Chinese mainland.

So therefore we recognized China, we became the first non-Communist country to start direct flights to the People’s Republic, and eventually our judgment and our diplomacy with China facilitated your diplomacy with China. People tend to forget—again, history. Henry Kissinger went for his first trip to China through Pakistan. Pakistan facilitated the entire connection between China and the United States from 1969, when the first Kissinger trip took place, to 1974, when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China, and the Shanghai Communiqué came about.
So, it’s one of those Washington things, you know? Something becomes a story. Like for example one candidate declares, for six days, everybody’s talking about that candidate until something happens and then that candidate’s story fizzles out—that’s the way it is. So China, Pakistan? No—China and Pakistan have been friends for a very long time. They have the historic outlook and therefore they understand the value of consistency. So whether our trade is up or down, whether military supplies are up or down, etc., etc., the Chinese have remained engaged with us, and they have remained consistent friends, and partners. And therefore, they have a slightly higher popularity rating—not slightly—a significantly higher popularity rating in Pakistan. They are seen as all-weather friends, compared with the Americans who are seen as fickle friends. And that’s the difference.

So we’ve never seen Pakistan relations with the US or China as mutually exclusive. We do not see the US and China as rivals for anything—they are both two great countries, they have their own strengths, and we certainly don’t think that China is interested in a cold war with the United States, and no one in the United States government has so far given us any hint that they look upon China as a major rival. This is not the Cold War. So China and Pakistan will continue to remain friends, while we are building our relationship with the United States. And hopefully our closeness to China will be of use to the United States, or the US’s closeness to China will be of use to us. I think that that’s the way we look at it.

On the subject of concrete steps that can actually improve the situation of the relationship between our two countries: I think that we need to understand that when events like the Osama bin Laden raid take place, there are always two sides to the argument. The Americans are upset that Osama bin Laden was in Pakistan, and I fully understand that. Pakistanis are upset that the Americans violated Pakistani sovereignty. I think we can both understand each other’s perspective and move forward. On intelligence relations, on military to military relations, again, I think both sides need to talk to each other directly. There are many things on which, when I meet government officials, we work things out. But when I read the morning paper, it seems things haven’t been worked out. And in an environment of agitation, when the Pakistani media is saying, “Americans doing this!” and the American media is saying “Pakistanis—” and then you have politicians on both sides saying, “What’s going on?” [It] makes things difficult. So I think for some time, we should continue with what we are doing, which is painstakingly build the relationship back, put pieces together, do the actual business of diplomacy, and keep the decibels low. Because the decibels have really increased in the last few months. It started with the Raymond Davis matter—the American side said, “Gosh, he has diplomatic immunity, release him tomorrow”; [the] Pakistani side said, “Immunity is kind of, we’re not sure, the paperwork is not complete, and furthermore, he did kill two people—is somebody going to apologize for that first? Or is he going to be subjected to some kind of process on return to the United States? What’s going to happen here?” And then of course we had a out of the box solution, in which his family and Mr. Davis, or the US government, reached an arrangement under our laws and he was set free. But it would still be good if the American side holds up its bargain of investigating as to what happened, because that’s always the way it happens. Even with diplomats—even if I was to commit a crime, God forbid, in this country, I would be immune, but at the same time, my government would be expected to at least investigate and ask me a few questions, even if I am not allowed to be arrested or put into any criminal judicial proceeding in this country.

But from that point on, it’s always been what I call relationship by shouting at each other. It’s not going to work. It’s not working for either one of us. So let’s just lower the decibels, let the professionals. Secretary Clinton is a great leader; she has done a wonderful job with many countries in working out difficult situations. Among your political leaders, people like Senator Kerry, who is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he has often been very good at trouble-shooting. The Central Intelligence Agency is in the process of a leadership change, but they too, they are very professional, they always work out a way to do things—that’s what their job is, out of the limelight. And the Department of Defense, they understand. If there is one thing that the US military understands, it is the value of having relationship with other militaries in the world. And I think we should let those processes
take place, and bring the decibels and the anger on both sides down, and move forward. I think we can, and I am quite certain we will.

Ms. DeYoung: Yes, we had a question over there.

Question: My name is Kimberly Crichton and I am simply a curious citizen. I wonder, although this may not be very diplomatic, whether you think Afghanistan is the equivalent of Yugoslavia, and has no coherence.

Ambassador Haqqani: Actually Afghanistan has been more or less a state in its present form for almost 700 years, which doesn’t make it comparable to Yugoslavia at all. In fact there was an Afghan state and there was an Afghan kingdom going back quite a while in history. The problem, of course, is that we tend to think of—nations have different stages of modernization, and different stages of evolution of political and other institutions.

And when I was teaching here in this country, in my years in exile, one of the things I used to do was, I used to say to my student—my American students—I said, don’t think the world is divided between Americans and wanna-be Americans. There are people who just want to live their lives the way they want to live their lives. And so don’t always think that, “Afghanistan? Which part of Kansas is Afghanistan like?” It isn’t. [Laughter.]

And the second thing I used to tell everyone is that the other thing you have to understand is America is a nation of problem-solvers. It looks for engineering solutions. It’s always, if this doesn’t work, let’s invent a newer model, find a better way, you know? Too many side effects, the FDA pulls out the drug from the market, etc., etc. But that is not the function of global diplomacy and international relations. The world is not a problem for America to solve. The world is a reality for America to understand and live with.

So some things you have to live with, some things you can influence and change, interact. And, look, historically, the Americans have always succeeded in influencing nations they have interacted with, not the nations they have not interacted with. Without inserting myself into a domestic American argument, and I have to be very cautious in saying that, look at the difference between your influence on Eastern Europe, with whom you interacted with, and North Korea, Iran and Cuba—countries that you actually don’t maintain diplomatic relations with. Where were you most successful, in terms of bringing your values, and making people understand your perspective, and even change their own conduct closer to yours? So I think Afghanistan also over time will have that interaction, etc., instead of going with the agenda and saying, “It’s either-or, break up or become like—if you can’t be California, at least be like Arkansas—” Ain’t gonna happen.

Ms. DeYoung: Yes—

Ambassador Haqqani: Gosh, two Kimberly’s back to back.

Kimberly Dozier: Kim Dozier with the AP. Ambassador Haqqani, bringing you from the philosophical back to the news of the day, National Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan—

Ambassador Haqqani: I was doing so well. [Laughter.]

Ms. Dozier: I know, I’m sorry! [Laughter.] John Brennan today unveiled the White House’s new counterterrorism strategy two years in the making, and in it he spoke of the relationship with Pakistan, and said he wished that the Pakistani people would be more honest with themselves about the fact that a lot of the terrorism in the world emanates from their territory. That was said in the context of describing a strategy where he said there will be operations such as the raid on the Osama bin Laden compound again, and that the US would take other similar actions, i.e. drones, but he never said the
word. So how do you think that is going to play on the streets of Pakistan, while you’re talking about bringing the rhetoric down, and what do you think of the strategy?

Ambassador Haqqani: Well, I haven’t, in all honesty, fully examined the strategy, and any comment on that will involve consultation between my embassy and Islamabad as well, so we’ll wait to comment on that.

I think that we do feel that we have made a significant contribution in fighting terrorism. We are a victim of terrorism. At the same time, we understand that there is an internal dialogue that has to take place in Pakistan as well, and it is taking place. If you read the Pakistani press, every day both opinions are there—there are those who blame it all on America, and there are those who say, “You know what? This is not about America. This is about problems within our country. This is about radical and extremist views within our society.” There are those who say, “We have terrorist violence against religious minorities. And that certainly has nothing to do with international political issues. So we need to wake up to that reality.” The people who kill our religious minorities—our Christians, our Ahmadis, our Hindus, Shi’a Muslims—those people are also terrorists, and they are linked to the same people who are engaged in anti-American violence across the border in Afghanistan and threatened similar violence inside Pakistan. They are the same people who attack our army and our intelligence services, and our government officials. So it is a dialogue that is taking place in Pakistan.

We are quite confident that the United States and Pakistan can work together, should work together. There is no need for unilateral actions. In all honesty, what do you think would have happened if the President of the United States had called President Zardari a few hours before the Abbottabad raid and said, “We know where Osama bin Laden is, we would like our operatives and your operatives to go after him together?” If there was concern about the information being leaked, etc., the American side could have said, “We are not going to tell you where. We’ll just do it together. We’ll arrive, and once we have arrived in your air base, your guys and our guys can board the aircraft—helicopter together and do it together.” It could have happened. There have been operations like that. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was found in Pakistan. All the others, the significant people. Abu Zubaydah. So many. In fact, I would like to know how many of the current inhabitants of Guantanamo were arrested in countries other than Afghanistan or Pakistan, with the help of Pakistan intelligence services.

So I think that sometimes we just go from one end, of great allies, great friends, which is what the mantra was here at one time, in the previous administration, to, gosh, these guys suck, they’re no good, etc. [Laughter.] This is not the way to do business between two allies and partners, and I think we will not interpret Mr. Brennan’s remarks as the latter. We understand them to be a reflection of an American statement of policy, and the Americans have the right to defend their homeland by insuring that terrorists who are plotting against the American homeland are dealt with. But as far as we are concerned, we are very cognizant of our sovereignty, we would like to protect our sovereignty, and sovereignty requires that when operations take place in Pakistan, they should take place with our knowledge and our participation.

Ms. Dozier: A quick follow: does that mean if there is a second raid, sir, that your forces would fire on the raiders?

Ambassador Haqqani: Kim, when I became Ambassador to the United States, I went and saw a very good colleague of mine. Another professor of international relations. And I said, “I’ve been ambassador before, but that was in a very nice, laid back country called Sri Lanka. So what do you think is the one thing I should bear in mind while serving as ambassador, having been in academia and this and that?” And he said, “Do just remember one thing.” And I said, “What?” He said, “Never answer a question that begins with ‘if.’” [Laughter.]

Question: Mr. Ambassador, my name is John Howes, I’m with the Redland Energy Group in Washington, DC. I don’t have a question to you, I have a question through you, to act as a barometer from what you’re hearing from your citizens back in Pakistan. We have a presidential election coming
up next year, and I can’t believe that nobody in your country is paying any attention at all to it. I’m thinking about the Republicans—some of them are saying we’re spending way too much on stuff overseas, we’ve got to take that money over there and spend it here, to help our country through this recession. I’m curious as to what you’re hearing from your country about President Obama’s performance—should he be reelected? Are you hearing any concerns about the Republicans? What are you hearing from your people about next year’s presidential election?

**Ambassador Haqqani:** I’m sure that I’m hearing quite a lot, but again, ambassadors are never supposed to comment on the domestic politics of the host country. Not all American ambassadors follow that principle in other countries. [Laughter.] But all Pakistani ambassadors do. [Laughter.]

As far as political rhetoric is concerned, let’s be real. This is not the first time it has happened. I’m a student of American political history— isolationism has been a significant intellectual strand, and sometimes not even intellectual, just a political strand in America’s history. There are people who think, “We’re safe, we’re okay,” but in this era of globalization I think Americans have to be very careful in embracing that.

The American government spends far more on its military preparedness than it does on diplomacy. Diplomacy is supposed to be—and that includes assistance, and foreign aid, and everything—diplomacy is the means to avoid war. So, there is something wrong when you spend more on preparing for war, and very little on actually avoiding war. And I think that there is a real disconnect in this country, where people will say, “We are advocates of a strong defense, but not advocates of a strong diplomacy”—and all tools of diplomacy. So, without getting into the American domestic political arguments, if you have friends in either the Republican or the Democratic Party, and they include people with this kind of view, that, “Oh God, we are spending too much money overseas,” well, really, you would spend much less overseas if instead of having to deal with people hating you and opposing you, you actually had less people hating you and opposing you. And you could be the world’s leaders without having to spend that much money, because people look towards you for your ideals.

I often tell my own personal story. I was a young boy in Pakistan, growing up in the city of Karachi. I was born in a family that couldn’t afford air-conditioning—it was rather expensive in those days. I was a relatively good student at school, scholarship kid, and I used to go to the American library because it was air-conditioned and it had lots of books. [Laughter.] And in summer it was a great refuge for me. I read a lot of stuff. I have still, still not met an American 17-year-old who has read the Federalist Papers—I had, as a Pakistani 17-year-old. And many years later, when I became a journalist, I was at the American Embassy for Thanksgiving Dinner, and after dinner, the Ambassador at the time invited everybody to play a game that had just been introduced called Trivial Pursuit. And guess who beat the American Embassy diplomats at the game of Trivial Pursuit on American history? [Laughter.] After which the American Ambassador asked me how long I had spent in the United States, and I said, I have never visited the US. All my knowledge is essentially book knowledge. And, of course, he decided to rectify that by getting me an invitation to come here under the US State Department’s International Visitor Program, which I think was the best use of American taxpayer money ever—because you ended up having somebody know your history, appreciate your nation’s ideals, without being born in your country and without ever adopting your citizenship or applying for it. Somebody who’s from another country, loves his own country, but looks at your country with admiration. You could have millions more like that, at much less cost—I assure you that my international visitor 6-week program and all the spending on the American library in Karachi was much less than the price of the drones that you are having to use to take out terrorists there. So there are two ways of looking at it: one is, spend more on defending yourself, or spend a little bit also on avoiding antagonizing people and making them into enemies. [Applause.]

**Question:** Naveen Malik. Pakistan also spends a great deal of its GDP on the military in relation to how much it spends on its civilian infrastructure, and so I’m wondering, as a Pakistani American, a relatively young one, and being in frequent contact with the youth in Pakistan, I get the feeling that they feel that
the leadership has failed them in failing to strengthen its civilian infrastructure. I was wondering if you
could address [it].

**Ambassador Haqqani:** Pakistan has been ruled by the military directly for more than half of its
existence as an independent country, so we have never really had an open debate on what our national
priorities ought to be. National security is always important, protecting sovereignty is always important,
ensuring that your country is safe from external enemies is always important, but at the same time it is
also important to have an educated population, strong infrastructure, investment in healthcare, and
having the wherewithal for being part of the 21st century as a modern country. The elected leadership
in the last three years has introduced some very new things—for the first time our defense budget is
being debated in parliament, or discussed in parliament.

We are not there yet. We are not there yet because we are still coming out of almost four decades of
domination, four and a half decades of domination by a politicized military—which is different from
military. We all love our military. We care about it because these are people who fight for us, but at the
same time we don't like them running our government. We don't like them taking over power in coups
d'état. But since 1958, we have spent most of our life under the shadow of a politically interventionist
military, and so we are coming out of it now. Our military leadership has made it clear that it has no
intention of reverting to that.

It will allow us to have a more open debate, more robust debate. So your generation will have an
opportunity to actually debate—how much do we really need to spend on defense? Who are our
enemies? What is our defense strategy for—how can we optimize our defense without allocating all our
resources on supporting a military? How do we avoid the fate of the Soviet Union which tried to match
the United States weapons system and ended up having an internal collapse? And those are things
that our military leadership and our civilian leaders are both aware of.

People forget—in 2008, we had a transition. We transitioned from being under a coup-making general
taking part in a military coup to an elected government. Look, the elected government has relatively
less political experience. Being in prison or being in exile is not experience for running government, and
there is restlessness because it is a young population. Especially, I mean I’m on Twitter, I see
Facebook. The Facebook, Twitter kids—they're just going on and on and on about change tomorrow.
Change doesn't come tomorrow. When you are 54 you'll realize that you had to go through what you
went through from 24 to 54 to get there, so you can learn faster, but change won’t happen tomorrow.

And so, understanding the dynamics of Pakistan's history and internal change is important before
Pakistan makes these changes. It's only a matter of time before we find the equilibrium between
investing in our children's education, our population's health care, our infrastructure needs, our
investment in those things that will enable us to become a vibrant economy—and at the same time
maintaining a robust and healthy defense. But for that, we have to win the war against the terrorists
first.

**Ms. DeYoung:** Can I just interject a question in there? As over these last three years of civilian
government—almost three years—and as you say there has been some rapprochement with India,
Pakistan at the same time has increased its nuclear weapons capability and research, perhaps more
quickly than any other country in the world. Why does the Pakistani government see that as necessary?

**Ambassador Haqqani:** Pakistan's nuclear policy as you know has always been relatively simple.
Pakistan is part of global efforts for non-proliferation. Prime Minister Gilani attended President Obama's
nuclear security and safety summit. We are willing to be part of any global effort to do away with
nuclear weapons.

However, what we are not prepared for is having a much larger neighbor than ourselves having nuclear
weapons and us not having a nuclear deterrent. That's been our policy. And so, our nuclear deterrent is
primarily a regional-specific nuclear deterrent, and even there, we have never foreclosed the possibility of future conversations, negotiations and dialogue which can find a solution and a way forward.

We generally tend to be like all nations—we tend to be secretive about our nuclear weapons and our actual warheads, etc. And again, once we are in the process of dialogue and normalization with all of our neighbors, we feel more secure, I think that that is going to be less and less significant than it seems right now.

Ms. DeYoung: Yes, sir? And over there, thank you.

Question: Thank you to Mr. Ambassador. It's been most interesting. I'm David Klaus, I'm a member of the Rotary Club of Washington, DC. And the Rotary movement worldwide has been trying to eradicate polio since 1985. And last month I was at our annual convention, which happened to be in America, and Bill Gates spoke to us and he gave all kinds of data about how we're closing in on the eradication of polio, and he pointed out there are four countries left where it's still endemic: Nigeria, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. And the last full year for which there is data, of course, is 2010, and he said it has decreased in Nigeria, India and Afghanistan—in Afghanistan apparently they have truce days where they quit fighting while they bring in the kids to get vaccinated, but it had increased from 60 some to 144 from 2009 to 2010. He didn't give reasons or hypotheses why this might be so, but it seems to indicate that there are parts of the country that just are too restless or not under the controls of the vaccinations aren't happening. Do you have some insight on that?

Ambassador Haqqani: Well, first of all, those are absolute numbers, so, you know, 167, again, the size of population has to be borne in mind, and of the four countries you mentioned, the fastest population growth is in Pakistan. And so therefore we have more infants that require the polio vaccination. We have a national program for polio eradication. When Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto took over in 1993 for the second term, it was one of her first priorities and we actually brought it down considerably.

Right now in the last four years or so, the numbers have spiked a little bit and they have primarily been in one area, and that has had to do with two things. One is certain clerics taking the position that these vaccines are some kind of instruments of the devil etc., etc. And so some parents are refusing to even register the children's birth to let them have it. Well, you can't do anything about that. The other factor of course is security, but we are trying to reach that as well.

We do have a national polio eradication program which is supported fully by Mr. Gates and his foundation. He saw our president here in Washington, DC a few months ago and our president came for Ambassador Richard Holbrooke's memorial service and we sat together, and we may not be able to get to zero any time soon because if there is still that kid whose parents refuse to get him vaccinated, there is nothing anybody can do about it if that kid comes across the circumstances that give rise to polio. But we do hope that we will be able to bring the numbers back down to the relatively nominal numbers that we used to have in the mid-90s and the late 90s.

Ms. De Young: I think we have just a few more minutes and so let me take, I think there are three—

Ambassador Haqqani: Two or three questions together—

Ms. DeYoung: Yeah. Why don't we have that and, Elisabeth, you have a question and then your question. Go ahead.

Question: Joanne Young, Kirstein & Young. Mr. Ambassador, in your opening remarks, I believe you said that half of the population of Pakistan is under 18.

Ambassador Haqqani: It's a very young population.
**Question:** Very young. There has been a fair amount of coverage of these madrassas in Pakistan where the Qur’an is pretty much exclusively taught and there’s a real concern that radicalism is being sponsored in the teaching there. My question is: how widespread among the, I guess, boys of Pakistan are these madrassas, who’s supporting them and how concerned is the government about that? And my second question, if I may, when, in your opening remarks I believe you said that given that you're predominantly a Muslim country, that there were some sympathies by the population with some of the aims of these extremist groups—I can’t quote you exactly, but I just wondered if you could elaborate on that.

**Ambassador Haqqani:** First all—

**Ms. DeYoung:** Get the last questions.

**Ambassador Haqqani:** Sorry. Yeah. And we'll answer them all together. Don’t worry. [Laughter.] I will, I will. And if I have to answer only one I'll answer yours, don’t worry. [Laughter.]

**Elisabeth Bumiller:** Hi, Elisabeth Bumiller from The New York Times. I was just going to ask a generic question about the ISI—about the Pakistani Intelligence service. Are you 100% convinced that they are trustworthy and they have no links to insurgents? Thought I'd ask an easy question. [Laughter.]

**Ms. DeYoung:** And we have one more.

**Question:** Hi, Mr. Ambassador, my name is Nida and I’m from the Women's Foreign Policy Group. You have spoken a bit about aid and my question also has to do with that. Do you think that there is such a thing as too much aid, and do you think that it can harm the relationship between two countries? And can you speak on that in regards to the Pakistan-US relationship?

**Ambassador Haqqani:** So that The New York Times doesn't get mad at me, I should answer Elisabeth’s question first. The ISI is as trustworthy as any intelligence service in the world. [Laughter.] [Applause.] As far as the cooperation between the ISI and the CIA’s concern, it's an ongoing cooperation. There are days when one of them is upset with the other, there are days when both of them are upset with the other, and there are days when they are both happy with one another. That is the nature of intelligence, and I do not need to say something new.

I think that Secretary Gates, as he was leaving office, very wisely put it: “there are certain things that happen in the real world, especially in the world of intelligence, which I think, when we try to approach it with a very simple black-and-white sort of approach, they fall into the category of gray, and therefore we find them difficult.” But it’s in Pakistan's interest to eliminate the terrorist groups, and Pakistan's intel services, intelligence, is going to be part of all those efforts. The manner of doing it may not exactly conform to the expectations of some of our international partners, and what comes first, what comes second, etc., there will always be disagreements—that is the nature of the beast.

On aid, I would say, Nida, that it's one of those things on which people have different opinions. The purpose of aid should always be to enable somebody to get on their own feet, and to be able to do things on their own. If you create aid dependence, which Pakistan does not seek, does not want, and does not wish for itself, then you are not being helpful.

At the same time, I would say that just as there can be too much aid, there can also be too much debate about aid. [Laughter.] And just as it was Justice Porter I think who said about pornography that he doesn't know what the definition is, but he knew it when he saw it, similarly, when aid works, you can see it. And I think the real problem right now is that in this city in particular, an entire profession and occupation has evolved which is debating aid, figuring out aid, thinking of new ways of providing aid, critiquing aid, criticizing aid, and they spend much more money, time and resources on producing reports about aid than actually manifesting aid and letting it happen. And anything that requires 97 studies about how to do it is definitely something that needs to either be revisited or be done in a
different manner. You don't need 20 studies on how to build a school in Afghanistan—you just need to build a school in Afghanistan. And the same goes for Pakistan.

So too much aid? I'm sure that there is such a concept, but very frankly, you are young, don't join the ranks of the cynics in Washington, DC, who think, you know what, I'm going to make a career out of debating aid rather than doing it.

Whatever needs to be done as far as Pakistan is concerned—and I think everybody else in the world—nobody wants to be a recipient of aid forever. As long the assistance—the Germans received aid after the Second World War, and then, look at where Germany is today. Japan did. There are other countries. South Korea. So there are countries that receive assistance, find their own economic momentum and they take off, and there are countries that are in a cycle of receiving aid and not getting on their feet. That is the distinction that needs to be made. Aid that enables people to get on their two feet and move on is good, other aid is different.

Now the final question that came from this end. And that related to madrassas. Well, first of all, the number of madrassa students of Pakistan in absolute terms may be several hundred thousand, but in percentage terms, it's less than 2% of all kids who attend any kind of school. Some of these madrassas are radical. In fact we have in the audience somebody—and since I don't have their permission I am not going to identify them because it might embarrass them—who is already working on de-radicalizing the madrassas very successfully, and there are programs of that nature going on. The ICRD, which is an organization here, the International Center for Religious Diplomacy—Religion and Diplomacy—they have an ongoing program; there are Pakistani programs too.

There will always be conservative groups, religiously conservative groups, in every society that will have a slightly different world view than you and me on religion. What we should be concerned about is those who operationalize it into violence and terrorism. That should be our concern. We don't mind people who want to have a more conservative interpretation of religion in their religious schools.

Who funds them? They receive funding from people who sympathize with their goals and objectives from all over the world, particularly the Gulf region.

As far as the sympathy point I was making, was that in a nation the size of Pakistan—180 million—even if 1% of the people have a sympathy with the ideas—not necessarily of Al-Qaeda, but of the groups that actually think that the objective is creating a caliphate again, opposing modernity, throwing out Western imperialism as they see it, reverting back to a more puritanical, religiously-based order, that those people will always be in a society like ours, and for that matter in the greater Middle East. As I keep reminding everybody, our region is not going to be just another county in Kansas any time soon.

**Ms. DeYoung:** I think we've run out of time and I, first of all, want to think all of you for coming and for all your good questions, but I most of all went to thank our speaker, Ambassador Haqqani, for your candor and the generosity of the time that you've given us all, for teaching us a lot about how Pakistan works, and some Pakistani history, and even some American history. [Laughter.] So I thank you very much. [Applause.]